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Steering infrastructure futures and spatial planning. 
Political economies, polities and imaginaries and the potential role for national spatial 
planning frameworks 
Abstract 
This monograph investigates the place of macro-scale spatial planning in steering 
infrastructure development in Europe.  It starts from an examination of the way in which 
changes in the form of infrastructure development are driven by neoliberalisation and 
changes in the political and constitutional forms of states.  Macro-spatial planning, within 
states and at supra-national levels, has some role in steering major infrastructure, a role which 
is affected by the spatial ideas which actors have of the territories for which policy is being 
made. One focus is on the nature of such spatial imaginaries, and how this affects the abilities 
of democratic polities to project and debate their territorial futures.   
The paper examines four western European states as well as the reform of the European 
Union Trans-European Networks policy area.  This analysis generates an understanding of 
the interplay of the material and ideational forces referred to above.  This understanding is 
finally put to work to examine the possible scope to improve the working together of macro-
spatial planning in one case, that of the UK, concentrating on England within this now plural 
jurisdiction.  Efforts to promote a spatial framework for England have not been successful up 
to now, in part, it is suggested, because the neoliberalising dynamics have constituted an 
almost insuperable barrier to even imagining spatially coherent futures for England.  
However this might be taken as a challenge by academics and practicising planners, amongst 
many others, to stretch the bounds of thinking, in part by drawing on current transition ideas 
and other storylines exploring and arguing for long term steered change. 
Keywords:  national planning, major infrastructure, Europe, spatial imaginaries. 
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States are taking infrastructure issues seriously.  This applies most of all to the largest types 
of infrastructure, such as for transport and energy, where projects for rail lines, airports and 
motorways, and for many kinds of energy generation and transmission or transporting, 
continue to be promoted in developed countries, and are at the core of less developed 
countries programmes of investment.  Such planning, programming and investing is taking 
place in an enormous variety of political economic regimes, geographical contexts and 
governance templates.  International competitiveness is held by some interests to be 
dependent on such investment, with business corporations observing and perhaps admiring 
the rapid development of such infrastructure in authoritarian states, above all China, in 
comparison with the slow progress in Europe and USA.  International organisations have 
devoted much attention to the issue in recent years (OECD 2006, 2007, 2011), working on 
the assumption that world trade growth is generating the need for large scale infrastructure 
expansion, especially in transport, and that states must service these “gateway” needs.  The 
European Union (EU) has made infrastructure investment, in transport, energy and 
telecommunications, a core part of its Europe 2020 growth strategy (CEC 2010a, 2011a).  
This has been linked to a drive towards, in the long term, a low carbon Europe.  But the 
widespread resistance to infrastructure projects has become equally visible.  Whether labelled 
as Nimby or not, this resistance is not limited to just a few European countries and has now 
been subjected to widespread study (for example Devine-Wright 2011).  The same 
phenomenon has been documented for the United States (Pociask and Fuhr 2011).  In this 
context, national steering or even national planning may be making a comeback, in cases 
where such state leadership was previously held to be unnecessary, given the liberalising 
directions of the last three decades or more.  That planning or steering might be defined 
spatially, and the possibility of that is a key focus of this discussion. 
The purpose of the monograph is to explore the role of such macro-scale spatial planning in 
recent development of policy on infrastructure development in Europe.  By “macro-scale” is 
meant primarily that carried out at national state level, but some consideration is given to the 
tendency to develop policy at EU level.  The work of states within federal or semi-federal 
systems, clearly very important in several EU cases (Austria, Germany, Spain), is not 
examined here in any detail, but the special case of the evolving component parts of the UK 
is included, as this introduces issues critical to the UK case, which is treated here at greater 
length than the three other case studies of France, the Netherlands and Spain. 
The analysis starts from an understanding of state policy making for infrastructure.   It is 
possible to analyse fields of state or public policy in a myriad of ways.  Here this field is seen 
as containing several elements, specifically finance (who does the investing), regulation 
(under what public constraints the investment takes place, and the industries are then 
managed), and spatial planning (geographical steering).  The last is often likely to be the least 
important, though to students of planning, it is naturally of great interest.  The way these 
elements are combined into a public policy regime has varied greatly in time and space.  In 
the simplest terms, a core dimension, seen here as the primary axis of variation, is the degree 
of state control and leadership.  This affects finance, regulation and spatial planning.  It can 
be thought of as a continuum, with the drivers of change of the last three decades pushing 
overall to less state control and dominance.  The two most important drivers are seen here to 
be changes in political economy (above all neoliberalisation), and changes in state forms 
(devolution, shifts in state management formulas, mainly).   
Here the primary focus is on the role of spatial planning in state policy for infrastructure.  The 
main interest is not in the detailed sphere of consenting, though this does come into the 
national and European analyses, but in the “big picture” planning, called here “macro-spatial 
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planning”.  The interest in this dimension is because the great potential for planning appears 
to be at this level, which has become of ever less interest to contemporary governments, 
much more focussed on consent processes and speed of decision making. 
The analysis will examine how macro-spatial planning works overall, with reference to 
different state levels, including some treatment of emergent EU processes.  A further element 
which is seen as important to the nature of any spatial planning roles in infrastructure policy 
is the evolution of the ideas of countries and territories, which are referred to here as “spatial 
imaginaries”.   The analysis therefore has a nested or funnelling character, which proceeds by 
looking at (1) state infrastructure policy making, (2) macro-spatial planning in state 
infrastructure policy making, (3) the role of spatial imaginaries in macro-spatial planning.    
Within each of the national case studies, the focus is on each of these aspects.  Naturally this 
is a long way from being a treatment of all matters related to state infrastructure policy or big 
scale planning.  But it is an appropriate focus in order to seek answers to the question of the 
role (actual and potential) of such planning within the development of infrastructure 
development in Europe, which is the question of most interest here. 
There is a long running theoretical debate in political science on the role of ideas, of 
“ideational” factors, as against more “material” dimensions (Hay 2002, John 1998).  In 
spatial planning this has some kind of equivalent in the interpretive and discursive turns of 
the last 20 years (for example Fischer 2003, Hajer and Wagenaar 2003), and more 
specifically in discussion of the force of images, maps and other mental representations of 
space and territories (Dühr 2007, Jensen and Richardson 2004, Neuman 1996).  In the field of 
planning examined here the visualisation of large infrastructure systems within ideas of the 
future of large territories appears to call for an engagement with this field of thinking.  How 
do the ideas of countries, spatial imaginaries, relate to ideas of big infrastructure systems and 
the connecting up of territories, urban systems and ecosystems?  These ideas may have longer 
lives and differently acting powers from the force of (in part shorter run) phenomena like 
changes in political economy and in the constitutions and functioning of states. What sort of 
“independent” power may such spatial imaginaries have?  Hay’s view in the political science 
debate (2002) is that the ideational and cognitive are intimately connected with the material.  
In the case examined here, this might mean the mixing together of the “hard” factors in 
infrastructure development with the “soft” force of ideas of territories.  The approach here is 
not to separate out these dimensions, but to analyse them together.  Thus neoliberalisation 
may select for certain sort of imaginaries (often ones hidden to normal view), but the 
presence of certain spatial ideas may facilitate macro-spatial planning which can then in turn 
feed back to generate state steering, countering stronger forms of neoliberalising effects.  
This element of the study is taken further in sections 3.2 and 5.0. 
Two sections follow this introduction, before the country studies.  The first section presents 
an understanding of state policy making for infrastructure in its broader context.  The second 
section brings into this understanding a discussion of how large scale spatial planning relates 
to this policy making.  
The main focus is analytical and explanatory. But the final section of the monograph 
examines the implications of the analysis and considers a particular policy question: could the 
making of a national spatial planning framework help to improve policy in the field of major 
infrastraucture?  Clearly there are other potential governing innovations or instruments which 
might carry forward such policy improvement.  Examples could include smarter sectoral or 
sub-sectoral planning (for all transport systems, or just for rail, say), comprehensive use of 
market instruments amidst as total liberalisation and privatisation as possible, or simply 
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concentrating on getting project level decisions right.  Here all of these are set aside, 
important though they may well be, to concentrate in the later part of the paper on the 
national level of spatial frameworks.  The UK will be used as a case example to explore the 
facets of reforming this instrument. 
The empirical work here stems largely from a research project conducted in 2008-2010 under 
an ESRC fellowship, updated where needed by means of further documentary work and some 
limited interviews. Full details of sources for each of the European country studies, the UK 
work and the EU section can be found in the working papers and a book based on the 
researchi. Virtually all the work reported here is in summary form, with almost no direct 
reference to interview material, and only limited direct quotation from documentation.   
2.0 State policy making for infrastructure 
The making of infrastructure can be analysed along several dimensionsii.  One critical one is 
the balancing of the roles of public and private sectors, the tasks allocated for states and 
markets. This has changed radically in most European countries in the last three decades, as 
liberalising and privatising policies have gained generally increasing sway in most states.  
State policy itself can be examined along horizontal and vertical dimensions. Horizontally 
policy may be more or less integrated or sectoralised, depending on the structuring of 
governments, including the divisions within ministries and agencies.  Vertically powers may 
be distributed between tiers of governments, with central levels sharing powers and finances 
with federal state, regional and local governments.  In the fields of major infrastructure 
examined here, the sharing is more likely to be at the higher levels of governments, although 
groupings of local authorities, particularly the largest ones, can be involved in decision 
making on for example ports or airports in several countries, whilst in some countries local 
energy, waste and water concerns are still directly or indirectly managing those sectors.    
These divisions can therefore be analysed in each case, to show the complex landscape of the 
political economy and governance of infrastructure management and development.   
2.1 First driver - neoliberalisation 
In the recent historical period (taken as approximately the last three decades) there are two 
main drivers of change in this set of infrastructure policy landscapes.  The first can be 
broadly characterised as neoliberalisation.   
Theoretical work by Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore (Brenner at al 2010), 
promoted a revised approach to thinking about the evolving pathways of neoliberalising 
capitalism.  An earlier paper (Peck and Theodore 2007) had examined the potential of the 
“varieties of capitalism” (VOC) approach, and in the 2010 article the potential and 
shortcomings of that body of work was joined by a review of work in two other traditions, 
before they presented their preferred approach.  This goes under the label of “variegated 
neoliberalisation”, not a very pretty phrase but a useful one.  Another way they describe it, as 
“systemically produced geoinstitutional differentiation” (2010, p 207), is perhaps no lighter 
on the tongue.   
Peck and Theodore’s criticisms of VOC work are largely convincing.  That model, presented 
in many variants but in developed forms in Hall and Soskice (2001), proposed that current 
capitalism can be best characterised by treating national states separately, and classifying 
them according to industry structures and business practices, alongside state policies in key 
areas.  The result, at least in Hall and Soskice (2001), was to generate a simple split of liberal 
market economies, with the USA as the model, and coordinated market economies, with 
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Germany as the type case, and with all developed capitalist states falling into one category or 
the other – for example the UK placed with the USA, and France and Japan with Germany.  
This simplicity certainly caught journalistic and political attention for a while, but it does 
oversimplify and moves too far from reality. 
The variegation model seeks to create a more flexible, fluid and dynamic understanding of 
contemporary processes, by stressing the layered and complex way in which neoliberalising 
processes have changed different national situations over three decades or more, with the 
recent phase seeing a deepened embedding of neoliberal features in all developed countries.  
The force of internationally operating powers is stressed, both material and ideological, as 
well as understanding these as rooted in particular states.  This helps to get away from a too 
clear division between change happening within states, and that happening transnationally or 
even globally – a parallel aspiration drives the work of Massey, as in her study of London in 
World City (2007), where she emphasises how London was both part of a global process, but 
also a key driver of that change.  The spatiality of political economic change is therefore seen 
as operating in complex ways, with scale conceived in part relationally or perhaps diagonally 
– despite lengthy recent debates, the conceptualisation of such matters has hardly reached a 
comfortable linguistic formula, at any rate in English.  
The temporal aspect is stressed by Brenner et al.  They refer to the “sporadic, yet wave-like, 
non-linear sequence, generating important cumulative impacts” (2010, p 184).  More fully: 
“the spatial unevenness of neoliberalization processes results not simply from a haphazard 
accumulation of contextually specific projects of marketization, but rather from patterned 
and patterning processes – the consequence of continuous, path-dependent collisions 
between inherited institutional landscapes and emergent path-(re)shaping programmes of 
regulatory reorganization at both micro and macro scales” (2010 p 202).  The layered, wave-
like and cross-scalar processes imagined by Brenner et al fit rather well the transformation of 
infrastructure steering and governing regimes under way in Europe during the neoliberalising 
decades. 
A partial caveat to Brenner et al’s work is the need, nevertheless, to focus very carefully on 
national models and how these are formed.  This is in part consistent with the work of 
Brenner et al: they note that VOC work calls attention to “the relative durability of 
institutional geographies at the national (state) scale” (2010 p 206).   There is strength in the 
insistence of the VOC approach that national models are distinctive, viewed at any one 
moment, whilst any simple typology of such models is to be rejected.  The challenge then is 
to pick out any relevant state distinctiveness and relevant commonalities in whatever sector 
or field one is interested in, as well as to understand the interplay of transnationalising forces 
into, out of and around national state formulasiii.   In the case of approaches to major 
infrastructure, the aim is to balance the powerful international forces of neoliberalising drives 
of the last three decades or more, against the remaining considerable differences between 
national states, in the European cases studied.   
Part of these international forces is the new world of infrastructure industries and financing 
that has emerged in the last two decades or so.  This is very variable across sectors and sub-
sectors, with say the global nuclear power industry quite different from that for waste 
treatment or managing buses.  But overall, companies have internationalised, often to a global 
level, leaving for example around half a dozen important gas, electricity and water companies 
dominating many countries in Europe (work by the Public Services International Research 
Unit, PSIRU, details this, for example Hall 2010, Hall and Lobina 2010 and Thomas 2009).  
Nationally based and sometimes publicly owned operations remain important in some 
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countries, but the force of private power now present in the large companies needs to be 
factored in when considering infrastructure policy making.  Equally the presence of private 
equity infrastructure funds since around 2000 has changed the nature of investment in some 
countries and branches.  This Macquarie style of operationiv was being predicted as a likely 
future model, up to the crisis beginning in 2008, since when commentators have been less 
confident of the growth of this approach.  At the same time, however, the crisis is putting 
even more stress on public finance in many countries, which may be producing a further 
round of privatisation, and governments turning even more to possibly risky private 
providers. 
2.2 Second driver – changes in state forms 
The second driver is alteration in constitutional and political arrangements, which have been 
changing the forms of states.  This is generally interpreted as autonomous of the processes of 
neoliberalisation, even if it may be argued that there are some common features which have 
pushed along both processes, particularly the varied ideological pressures which argue 
against “big government” or “top down” policy models.  Just as with the neoliberalisation 
analysed above, the devolving or rearranging of state power has been highly variable across 
Europe, with some states affected relatively little (such as Germany and the Netherlands), and 
some deeply altered by these processes (Spain, the UK, France).  So there has been a two 
level variegation under way. But on top of this must be layered the dynamics of 
Europeanisation.  Europeanisation is treated here as the process of national policy areas being 
affected by European decision making (for a fuller and more complex characterisation, see 
Dühr et al 2010 chapters 7 and 23).  It is widely considered that over the last 30 years some 
hollowing out of national state power has been attributable to evolution of the EU.  In the 
fields of infrastructure this is easily identifiable in the fields of transport, energy, water and 
waste.  In every one of these areas critically important policy has been made, largely by 
powerful Directives, constraining subsequent action by all member states.   
There are major differences amongst political scientists about how these changes should be 
interpreted, but one widely shared line of argument points to increasing “interdependence” 
between states in Europe, as well as between those states and the rest of the world (Hay 
2010).  This does not by any means see an all dominating EU (or any other international 
regimes) sweeping away traditional state power.  The post 2008 period is widely seen as a 
time of the reassertion of such state power in response to economic crisis, with both sub-
national and supra-national power centres challenged by this reassertion (Thompson 2010).  
But this does not mean a retreat in the fields of infrastructure to “islands” of policy making 
within state boundaries.  The dynamics of neoliberalisation, empowering large international 
corporations in most infrastructure sectors, push against such retreat, and potentially 
encourage the continuing growth of international regulatory action, including by the EU 
(Whitfield 2010, also PSIRU publications as above). 
In the field of spatial planning Europeanisation is generally seen as less advanced (Dühr et al 
2010 stress the need to examine each state individually, as they do for three cases).  However 
EU sectoral policies have certainly in some cases powerful spatial effects.  In the 
infrastructure field the most important policy area is that of Trans-European Networks 
(TENs), and this will be the focus of section 3.3.  It will be seen that the latest reforms 
proposed to TENs have a real potential to impact on planning, in ways that may compete with 
or even supercede often weakening processes of macro-spatial planning within states. 
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Therefore, the constitutional and political landscapes that have been emerging over these 
decades have powerful effects on infrastructure policy making.  Changes will doubtless 
continue, whether in dramatic form such as state break up (perhaps in the UK, Spain or 
Belgium) or more modestly in changes in financial and regulatory balances within states and 
between states and the EU. 
3.0  Macro-level spatial planning and the spatial imaginaries of shaping countries 
3.1 The evolution of macro-spatial planning 
At the broadest level, the two drivers discussed above have impacted as powerfully on “big 
planning” as they have on the way infrastructure is made (or not made).  Before the 1980s 
some European states had quite strong spatial planning processes at central government level.  
This continued in one case, the Netherlands, if in strongly moderated form, but elsewhere the 
dual pressures of liberalising and devolution cut back such influence significantly.  In some 
cases (the Spanish autonomous communities, the devolved administrations in the UK), new 
forms of macro-spatial planning have been invented.  At the same time, as will be seen in 
more detail below, the EU has been developing some capability over spatially relevant 
aspects of infrastructure.  This has potential to take over some of that force of big scale 
spatial steering, that was to some extent present in earlier eras within national states.  This 
remains, as will be seen, largely only a potential, though it can be argued that 
Europeanisation, through framing and ways of imagining, has already had some effects on 
how key determinants of long term spatial change are shifting. 
Macro-level spatial planning does not have to take a comprehensive or integrated form.  That 
is certainly the kind which planners have always aspired to, in its ideal (or idealised) Dutch 
form.  But it can also consist of sectoralised planning of particular fields like railways or 
ports, or, to move to the weakest form, of apparently non-spatialised policy making where the 
policy content necessarily implies a certain distribution of spatial effects, by for example 
prioritising a list of investments or by supporting particular policies which will have clearly 
differential spatial impacts.  Certainly this third type would only qualify as planning if it had 
contained some thinking about large scale geographies behind the policy, even if 
unacknowledged or only weakly analysed.   
Of what did “traditional” big spatial planning consist?  In say the 1960s a very centrally 
directed strategy was made up for the whole range of major infrastructure systems, with an 
image of French or Dutch national planning at their height, or even Soviet or Communist 
systems of control and investment.  These required a clear idea in the minds of their creators, 
whether politicians or planners or some wider public, of what territorial futures were desired.  
Bodies like DATARv and the Commissariat General du Plan in France and the National 
Physical Planning Agency in VROM (the planning, housing and environment ministry) in the 
Netherlands were required to prepare societally and politically acceptable strategies, whether 
fully comprehensive of all major infrastructure sectors or not.  Some wider societal consensus 
was needed for this to be possible, as to how the country or nation should develop or change 
– in a centralised or decentralised way, in a resource and energy intensive way or not, 
strongly connected with and dependent on other areas of the planet or not (ports, airports).  
For the countries which had such strong steering mechanisms in the high Keynesian period 
from the 1940s to the 1970s, the idea of the future had to be quite explicit, with almost 
certainly maps indicating general ideas, even if blurred to varying extents for political 
purposes.   
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The nature of some examples of this period was surveyed in Alterman’s volume of 2001, 
looking at national level dimensions of planning, both within the classic period, and in the 
1980s and 1990s when in many cases less strong and integrated approaches were being 
adopted.  Alterman found that countries at that time maintained some desire and capacity to 
undertake national steering, certainly in her key cases like Israel, Japan and the Netherlands.  
She also found that the steering was very often in a second form, of sectoral systems, dealing 
with say roads planning, or planning for energy systems (or parts of them), rather than in a 
comprehensive form.  Immediately it is clear that such approaches would not necessarily 
demand such a full idea of the country as more integrated styles.  However, it can be argued 
that there would still have to be an implicit conception of how the country was to be changed, 
even if this conception was more fragmented and plural than in more comprehensive cases.   
There can be a “third” stage of the decomposition of the high Keynesian state model, in 
which the central state no longer plans, at least explicitly, at all.  This may be for ideological 
reasons, that it is believed that all investment is best left to private corporations operating on 
profit and loss criteria, as with many railways systems in the nineteenth century, or for 
various practical reasons, including the federal or decentralised nature of states, meaning 
strong central leadership is no longer politically possible.  In fact such a condition (no 
planning at all) is much more rare than might be expected, and in general states have 
maintained the wish to plan sectorally at least, even where, as is common, they no longer 
control investment directly.  So the second case above remains, it appears, the norm, and it 
remains important to consider the ideas which may motivate the planning that does exist. 
3.2 Spatial imaginaries and macro-spatial planning 
It is now necessary to look in more detail at one particular focus of this monograph, the way 
in which steering of infrastructure is affected by the ideas of countries expressed in plans or 
sectoral policy making.  As argued in section 1, the role of ideas in spatialised form is 
important in planning, alongside more material forces.  This dimension is presented here in 
what some may see as a rather one dimensional and old fashioned way, with little account 
taken of the flowering of the several varieties of relational thinking of the last twenty years or 
more (Allen et al 1998, Amin and Thrift 2002, Amin et al 2003, Cochrane (2012), Jonas 
2012, Massey 2005).  There are two dimensions to that flowering.  In part relational thinking 
has challenged Cartesian or Euclidean ideas of space, arguing that traditional ideas of 
bounded and bordered entities like countries are no longer useful ways to think about change 
and the future.  Space is seen as more splintered or fragmented, discontinuous, with 
proximity or distance as very poor indicators of what is tied up with what in causal terms.  
The account of London by Massey (2007) is perhaps the best example of this thinking in 
action, problematising the ways of imagining London in some Russian doll set of region, 
nation, continent, globe. Secondly, the challenge of relational thinking is in the socialisation 
of spatial thinking, so that geographies are thought about in a less “flat” way, more infused by 
social relations of all kinds.   This comes to Massey’s idea of “power geometries”.  As she 
puts it in one summary account (1999 p.291): “We cannot make a judgement on the basis of a 
spatiality abstracted from power relations: always what is at issue is spatialized social power: 
it is the power relations in the construction of the spatiality, rather than the spatiality alone, 
which must be addressed”.   
Without denying the force of much of the “relational turn”, it is considered here that there is 
value in taking traditional understandings of geographical space, old style map based 
territories, as the basis for analysis, given the importance of this for most large scale spatial 
planning.  Although planning academics have been keen to pick up on this intellectual zone, 
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with discussions for example of “soft spaces” intended to lead the way beyond thinking of 
planning as only or predominantly in bounded spaces (Allmendinger and Haughton 2009), 
real world planning has been struggling to work in such terms.   Accounts of those with 
enthusiasm about relational approaches, such as Patsy Healey’s analysis of recent planning 
for Amsterdam and its region (2007), suggest that, despite the best efforts of the very-
network-society-aware Dutch planners, planning outputs continued to be produced in the 
same old form, plans for bounded territories, identifying land in the traditional manner.  The 
relationalist challenges were equally turned down by planners in her other case studies – here 
without even the significant efforts of the Dutch planners to operate in new ways. 
It may still be that, once say a national strategy is produced, it is possible to carry out, not an 
environmental or regulatory impact assessment, but a “relational sensitisation assessment”, 
which might suggest radically wrong, impractical or incoherent features of the strategy.  A 
more everyday equivalent of such a step could be the Territorial Impact Assessment 
instrument, which might be used in this way to examine impacts diagonally (Bohme and Eser 
2008).  Some of these thoughts are pursued in Section 6, but much must remain for future 
elaboration and development. 
How should the spatial imaginaries and macro-spatial planning be conceptualised?  It is 
impossible to “see” such imaginaries, which have to be excavated from the evidence of what 
is written down and what is done, in a partially speculative way.  Other students have had 
some success in doing this, in order to understand the nature of policy making at particular 
levels – one classic examination is that by Jensen and Richardson (2004) on European space 
making paths, whilst McNeill (2004) finds evidence for the changing imaginaries of 
Europeans and how different transport and communications systems create these new 
understandings.   
We may start simply, from the premise that in order to do something with a large 
geographical and spatial component, something must be existing in the mind or imagination 
of the actors involved.  This may be made evident in the form of maps or planning 
documents, as analysed effectively by Dühr (2007), or it may be a textual expression.  
Metaphors are commonly used – corridors, gateways, hubs, belts.  Spatial emphasis may also, 
as indicated above, be simply implicit in an approach, say to invest more in one part of a 
country than elsewhere, even if it would be politically difficult to spell this out.  Clearly there 
could come a point where the imaginary of the future form of the country is “so implicit” that 
one may doubt its existence.  Might there not be just a “garbage can” of sporadic and ill 
connected decisions forming the future territories, part state decided, part driven by market 
particularities?  Many economists would favour a purely market driven process, whereby the 
government simply sets tax and incentive and regulatory systems, but leaves the resultant 
geography to a myriad of investment decisions from below, fuelled by a myriad of possibly 
competing and conflicting imaginaries.  Certainly this is possible in part, and has happened to 
some degree in the past.  But there are strong limits to such non-geographically conscious 
societal steering in the case of major infrastructure.  They range from the risks of stranded 
investments, with serious implications for any economic system and certainly for capitalism, 
to the brute complexities of technical systems in space, in real and obdurate territories: cities, 
mountains, seas, airspaces (Marshall 2012).  Although states may try to (or pretend to) make 
policy in a spatially blind way, in the field of large infrastructure, this has little sense. 
All of this is deeply linked to the cohering sentiments on which states have generally been 
based in recent centuries, essentially nationalist ones.  The nature of national understandings 
affects the making of imaginaries, as well as their potential unmaking, as UK observers can 
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see in the varying paths of nationalism in the UK over the last half century or more, and as 
any Spaniard, Catalan or Basque (or Breton) could remind us.  This is not a primary theme 
here (for one now dated case see Marshall 1996), but it is valuable to remember how 
fundamental and deeply historical are some of the pressures affecting something as 
apparently everyday and practical as infrastructure and its planning. 
So every political unit, and above all the still dominant political unit of the state at national 
level, may be conceived as having ideas about its territory’s futures.  These ideas may be 
fuzzy, internally contradictory, politically contested in several dimensions, and on a spectrum 
of quite explicit to so implicit as to be quite difficult to pin down.  There is a scaling to such 
imaginaries, with subordinate local or regional polities having their own conceptions, and 
emergent continental and to some slight degree planetary imaginaries starting to play in with 
national formulas – at least continentally in the European case.  However the national state 
retains a key role in all sorts of ways, and it is essential to be able to keep this in focus, within 
neoliberalising capitalism’s wider dynamics.  In particular, not keeping such a focus is 
politically debilitating, removing the scope for democratic debate and decisions on major 
infrastructure futures. 
3.3 The European Union and macro-spatial planning 
EU level activity in the field of spatial planning has elements of all three types of big scale 
planning described above (Dühr et al 2010, Faludi 2010 are key references).  The main 
emphasis in the relatively brief treatment of the EU dimension here is on Trans-European 
Networks (TENs).  The attempt since the 1980s to build a base of spatial planning thinking at 
continental levels has not mainly been focused on infrastructure, though some of the content 
of the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) of 1999 and the macro regional 
strategy work since the Europe 2000 initiatives of the early 1990s has had infrastructure 
elements and implications embedded within it.  But the ESDP avoided all visual 
representations.  Spatial metaphors like the Blue Banana may have had resonance in wider 
discussion, but have rarely reached any clear EU policy form.  Perhaps more important has 
been the building of some kind of epistemic community (as Dühr et al 2010 discuss, pp.111-
112), of ways of thinking amongst planners active in their national planning contexts, of 
broader framing.  Jensen and Richardson (2004) understood the EU’s overall direction as an 
attempted sedimentation of a hyper-connected Europe, with a strong emphasis on rapid travel 
continentally, through the creation of a repertoire of spatial practices.  It is suggested here 
that this has been a gradually laid foundation for wider ideas of geographies, on which the 
more specific and detailed initiatives discussed below may now be building.  In a few special 
areas of Europe the spatial planning impact no doubt goes deeper, particularly in the Baltic 
where work up to 2010 led to a coordinated macro-regional strategy (CEC 2010b, VASAB 
2010).  This has been followed by an apparently weaker strategy for the Danube, but given 
that the outlook for further such macro-regional work is uncertain, this may prove to be only 
of limited significance for most of the EU (see a fuller discussion in Stead 2011).   The 
reform of the TENs policy area is analysed here in more detail, as here for the first time a 
potentially more direct spatial impact will emerge from a territorially specific EU policy 
field. This stems no doubt from the fears of infrastructure corporations that insufficient 
infrastructure steering will otherwise be available: extra continental wide capacity is needed 
to counter the weakening of national state capacity. 
3.3.1  The EU and infrastructure: TENs energy and transport reforms – overcoming 
neoliberalisation’s contradictions? 
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The Trans-European Networks (TENS) policy was formulated as part of the follow on from 
the Single Market drive of 1992, as it was thought that the now unified market needed more 
unified energy and transport systems (Dühr et al 2010).  Key projects were identified in 
transport, mainly for rail lines, in 1994, and supporting financial mechanisms were created to 
encourage implementation.  The energy involvement was lesser, with very limited financial 
support.  By 2008 some projects remained far from completion, but it was decided that a 
fundamental reform was needed.  The Commission’s review acknowledged that the planning  
of the transport part of TENs “has not been driven by genuine European objectives” (CEC 
2009).   There had been a real difficulty for the Commission in pushing national governments 
to press on with the priority projects (Stephenson 2010).  So the EU has been working up a 
package of TENs reforms.  This has separate energy and transport components, both of which 
entail the passing of a Regulation; these Regulations were under consideration in the 
European Parliament and Council in 2012-13.  This led to proposals in both fields by late 
2011 (CEC 2011b, 2011c).  The result is potentially to increase EU roles in these fields quite 
considerably.   
The reforms for energy include designating key projects as of European interest, for which a 
streamlined set of procedures will have to be applied by member states.  The projects will 
arise from the work of the new collaborative bodies set up in the electricity and gas 
industries, Entsoe and Entsog, which have prepared Ten Year Network Development Plans 
(TYNDPs), in conjunction with the European Commission (Entso-e 2010, Entso-g 2011).  
The new set of procedures results from an exhaustive study of problems arising in energy 
project implementation and the approaches different states were adopting (Roland Berger 
Strategy Consultants 2011).  Effectively the 2008 UK reforms (described below) were seen as 
best practice, and a similar model of “one stop shop” and faster decision making for the 
consenting process is being recommended.  The reforms are part of a wider package of 
consideration of energy policy as a whole, looking to 2020 and beyond for the achievement 
of key EU goals in low carbon, energy security and economic competitiveness. 
The transport proposals have involved the design by technical experts of a “core network” for 
the whole continent, made up of ten corridors, oriented around the main north-south and east-
west axes, and focussed especially on freight links, and so based on major ports at many ends 
of the axes.  Figure 1 shows one part of the core network, for rail freight. A “comprehensive 
network” remains alongside this as developed in the 1990s, effectively including all main 
arteries in all modes.  The key new proposal is to set up a corridor development platform for 
each corridor of the core network, with these platforms to prepare a corridor development 
plan, and oversee the implementation of the scheme, so as to complete the core network by 
2030.  Even more clearly than with the TYNDPs, this is evidently something which will 
impact on the planning of the territories in which the core network is to pass, and planners at 
all levels will have an interest in this institutional innovation.  It is too early to say what sorts 
of impacts on planning these would be, and they would vary greatly depending on the 
existing planning situation in a country or region (extent of national or regional planning 
coverage, integration of transport and others sorts of planning, for example). A new 
Community financial instrument is proposed to support implementation of the new 
programmes, in transport, energy and telecommunications. 
Figure 1 about here. 
These proposed reforms result in effect from the powerful liberalising drive of the successive 
energy and transport packages since the 1990s, which have pressed, with considerable 
success, for countries to unbundle their energy systems, and, to varying degrees, their 
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transport systems.  This has generated a very difficult investment context for the companies 
now expected to meet the EU’s demanding goals in these areas, and the TENs reforms surely 
emerge from the situation caused by the EU’s own actions since the 1990s.   New public 
steering mechanisms are being invented to make up for the loss of control caused by 
liberalisation.  These now take the form of strongly spatially detailed schemas, especially in 
the transport field. 
3.3.2 Bringing in spatial steering from above – a new sectoral layering 
These developments take place however against the reality of an extremely modest advance 
in any common public idea of the European territory as a whole, and with the EU given in 
many countries very low public legitimacy.  If any sort of national spatial planning is now 
seen as too demanding in the great majority of EU member states, we may well imagine that 
any sort of continental spatial plan could not rely on any plausible continental spatial 
imaginary that exists or might be developed.  The TENS reforms however take some 
significant steps to creating the skeleton of such a framework, if only in quite sectoralised 
terms.   
The field of major infrastructure has therefore become an important target of EU policy, 
strongly pressed by large infrastructure industry businesses, and supported, so far, by most 
member state governments.  This is interpreted as a step in the neoliberalisation pathways of 
the EU and therefore of European states approaches to infrastructure as a whole.  The 
approach is more interventionist than say the British National Infrastructure Plan, but has 
some of the same drive to make the investment context attractive to large corporations.  What 
is emerging is a layering of state policy at national and continental scales, with each scale 
reacting to and learning from each other, with each responding to the pressures of the various 
business and other interests with powerful influence.  The role of environmental interests, as 
represented by political parties and NGOs, is not discussed here, but these are also significant 
actors, and there are lesser elements in EU policy which respond to their concerns.   Overall 
though, the infrastructure approaches seen in the EU and UK respond most to a 
neoliberalising logic, to a greater extent than those analysed in France, Spain and the 
Netherlands.  It is essential therefore to see the common and the distinctive processes 
underway across the national cases.  Within-state and cross-state tendencies are both 
important in the design of new state or para-state steering mechanisms. 
4.0 National case studies 
The four European states examined here are very different.  There are, as should be clear 
from the discussion of neoliberalisation above, common trends affecting all four, but even the  
political economic changes differ strongly.  Evolutions in state form also vary dramatically.  
It will be evident therefore that states are highly distinctive.  They do not vary in ways that 
can, say, generate a neat explanatory schema on a four cell grid (though this can be a useful 
descriptive aid – see Table 1).  None are federal, but they are very different sorts of unitary 
state, with different evolving trajectories of change of state form in the last three decades.  
The planning systems are quite different.   All are affected by neoliberalising and to some 
extent Europeanising processes, but in different degrees and forms. They offer therefore the 
classic strengths of qualitative comparative analysis, to help understanding of the forces and 
trajectories at work, which vary in illuminating ways.  There is no aspiration to a “general 
theory” of state policy making for infrastructure, and the role of macro-spatial planning 
within this.  A broad sympathy for critical realist understandings of social science fences off 
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such an aspiration in any case: social science cannot strive for predictive capability stemming 
from such general theorising (Collier 1994). 
The country studies work from the conceptual foundations laid above.  It is intended that they 
demonstrate the application of a way of analysing the relationships between large 
infrastructure steering and national spatial thinking.   
Table 1 here. 
4.1 France 
The pathways of neoliberalisation have taken snaking and heavily contested routes through 
the France of the last 30 years.  More significant residues of strong state steering remain than 
in most other European states, as much in ways of thinking as in material forces.  The polity 
is marked by two powerful elements which are in some degree autonomous from 
neoliberalising: the decentralisation of state powers to regions and localities, and the 
continued sympathy for democratic forms in various shapes, taking elections, street actions, 
public debating more seriously than in most countries.  To understand the ways major 
infrastructure policy making has evolved, it is necessary to have some grasp of all these 
elements, and how they impact on ideas of the country.  First the neoliberalising paths, state 
form changes and the national imaginaries are examined, before relating the dominant 
infrastructure policy zones to these. 
4.1.1 French neoliberalisation and infrastructure 
The varieties of capitalism theorists put France in the coordinated market economies camp, 
but this was always somewhat uncomfortable, given the clear differences from the strong 
liberal strands always present in Germany and the Netherlands, or from the less nationally 
self contained Nordic states.  Even varieties of capitalism theorists like Schmidt (2002) were 
almost obliged to give France a separate category for itself.  So here a combination of looking 
carefully at the state on its own, and seeing the complexities of variegation effects and 
“external” impulses, is essential.  Nevertheless the main track can be described as strongly 
neoliberal, giving more power to private corporations and to stock markets and 
financialisation.  By the early 2000s France had a range of large internationally powerful 
corporations, even if some remained (and remain still) with significant state shares (EDF, 
GDF Suez), whilst others in transport, energy, waste and water, as well as the main branches 
of industry and finance, were largely privately owned.  A few important elements of public 
control remained, including the management of ports and airports, by now split between 
central state and local/regional state agents, the ownership of rail infrastructure, the 
concession systems for managing water and waste water and motorways: all these have given 
to the state some levers that it no longer had in the more heavily neoliberalised cases like the 
UK (certainly England within the UK).   
Membership of the EU was important in France’s divestment of public control over much of 
its economy during the 1980s and 1990s, as were the associated ideological currents flowing 
round the world.  France was equally at the centre of resistance to aspects of neoliberalism, 
providing much of the energy in the anti-globalisation movement which burst into action for 
a few years around 2000, feeding back on French “domestic” policy as well as influencing 
international and transnational change.  There is a strong case that France has been 
enormously impacted by EU membership (Smith 2006), with the gradual erosion of the 
importance of borders affecting territorial shaping, and a complex dance of appearing to be 
pushed by EU directives to liberalise, whilst really being content or at least resigned to go 
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along with these liberalising impulses – which especially affected France’s powerful 
infrastructure corporations.   
All this has had a complex layered temporal character.  Much of the force of state power and 
policy directions from the period of high state intervention remains as a substrate or deep 
current which can continue to push in particular policy directions.  Such deep currents may in 
fact be present in most countries, but they may at times be more visible in France, given the 
continuing discourse of national coherence which is still key to politics at the national level.  
So the commentary of Brenner et al (2010) on layering of neoliberalising processes fits the 
French case very well.  What they give less attention to is the importance of changes in 
polities, to an extent independently of more political economic processes.  In France this has 
been marked above all by the decentralisation waves of the 1980s and the 2000s, in which 
elected levels of government at regional, departmental and local level all received boosts in 
powers, legitimacy and funding, often at the expense of the central state (Le Gales 2006, 
2008).   This has pluralised the polity, such that “thinking like a state” has become a different 
thing from in the Gaullist heyday.   This then begins to link to the issues of the spatiality of 
the state and how France understands its futures. 
4.1.2 National spatial understandings 
The “default position” of thinking about France has historically been of the country as a 
unity, which should be steered in a unified manner by the French state.  This centred 
imaginary retains some force, despite the twin battering of neoliberalisation which splinters 
power centres and regionalisation which empowers the centrifugal forces potentially present 
in any larger polity.  But gradually the imaginary too has been pluralised, meaning that the 
two sided arguments of the post war decades, around Paris and not-Paris, have become more 
complex, even if the capital region issue can never really go away in such a single-centred 
state.   The EU effect has gradually played into this as well, with the DATAR theorists in the 
1990s giving great emphasis to seeing France within a continental spatial framework, and 
leading work on the European Spatial Development Perspective, with its stress on cross 
border porosity and polynuclear development forms.  There have been resurgences of 
nationally focussed thinking, so that the one territory model remains live: in the 1990s years 
of work round national schemas maintained thinking in that area, as has the work on the 
Grenelle, an environmentally oriented exercise since 2007 which has finally led to a national 
transport schema, though still in draft form, and to a reinforcement of national policy making 
on energy.    
There is thus a range of “spatial practices” (to use Jensen and Richardson’s 2004 term) which 
still carry ideas of France as a whole – some more of these will be mentioned below in 
summarising on infrastructure sectors.  However, more diverse ideas of the country have 
been reinforced, so politicians may well think at regional and local levels, and such thinking 
may be given effect, given available budgets and the deals that can be done with private 
corporations or with state agencies no longer really fully controlled by central government, 
like SNCF and RFF (dealing with most train services and with rail infrastructure 
respectively).  So there are many spatial practices which can compete within any national 
schemas and so can dilute the force of singularised national imaginaries.   An emphasis 
remains on the national in France, in comparison with most other European cases (the 
Netherlands and in different ways Scotland being exceptions, as we will see).  That is to say, 
there remains a powerful national spatial imaginary of the “hexagon” of mainland France, 
despite the geographical splintering of liberalising, EU and regionalising effectsvi.  But how 
much force this has to carry strong national policy remains unclear – the evidence of policy 
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attempts of the last two decades is that much more fragmented and sectoralised approaches 
now suit the French polity best.  Those attempts (the Pasqua and Voynet laws of the mid 
1990s, and the Grenelle initiative of 2007-2012) have probably had overall limited impact in 
determining infrastructure spatial forms, as against the more negotiated, contractualised and 
geographically punctuated processes of diagonal power politics. 
France never had a national spatial plan in the sense that the Netherlands has had.  In the 
1960s and 1970s the spatial dimension was contained within the national economic planning, 
whilst the work of DATAR in steering investment and urbanisation gave this geographical 
coherence, at that stage primarily to the benefit of large provincial centres, growth poles to 
rebalance France against Parisian dominance.  Investment in energy and transport was linked 
to this overall planning, although the specific and famous initiatives of that period, the 
nuclear programme and the high speed rail investment, were to some degree free standing, 
given their importance politically.  Water planning was, and still is, managed by public 
agencies covering river basins, in a relatively technocratic process, though one naturally 
consensualised with all levels of government.   
4.1.3 State sectoral planning of infrastructure 
Since the 1980s planning (“planification”, which does not have a necessarily spatial element, 
though for infrastructure it almost always does) has been more of a sectoral exercise, with the 
big agencies or corporations setting their directions for investment under state guidance, but 
without any explicit comprehensive strategies – this is the work of EDF (and now its grid 
partner RTE), GDF (now GDF-Suez), Total, SNCF (and since 1997 RFF for rail 
infrastructure).  There is normally however also a state sectoral planning process.  For roads 
and rail this is revised periodically, with the most recent and more ambitious version, the 
Schema National des Infrastructures de Transport (SNIT) coming out of the Grenelle and so 
with a strongly green emphasis, but taking very long to prepare and still at the time of writing 
not approved by the Assembly and so the final guidance of the state (see Figure 2 for a 2011 
draft version).  The SNIT is different from earlier transport documents in bringing into one 
planning exercise consideration of all terrestrial modes, and ports, and, in principle, airports, 
although in the last case the integration appears to be limited.  Equally a strong drive has been 
present in the SNIT to prioritise and quantify for the long term infrastructure maintenance 
and improvement, as against new build.   
Figure 2 about here 
For energy, there is also a regular state planning exercise, separately for gas and electricity, 
which lays out the state’s preference for investments over coming years, which must then, in 
principle, be followed by all investors.  Thus for example this incorporated in the last two 
rounds the programme for off shore wind, with zones identified from the top and licensing 
rounds set in motion.  Similar leadership from the top has been shown in the nuclear 
programme, always a politically protected zone, where the president decides – in the case of 
Sarkozy, for the development of at least two new stations, though work only began on one 
during his presidency. 
4.1.4 France, neoliberalisation and state coherence 
How then should the situations shown in these very brief sketches be understood in relation 
to the frameworks adopted here?   The decay of more comprehensive national steering, of 
infrastructure as of other sectors, is clearly due to the change of state model marked by the 
advancing neoliberalisation of France, beginning even in the 1970s under the liberal turn of 
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the Giscard d’Estaing presidency.  But the decay has been given its present shape by the 
completely French born and bred decentralisation dynamic, even if we can always see 
elements of coherence between the changes in state forms and political economy.  The 
minimum coherence required is that packages of changes do not go directly against each 
other: the coherence required of internally related key societal pathways.  At least we can say 
that French decentralisation did not go against the grain of the forms that French 
neoliberalising took, even if it must be seen as a separated phenomenon.   We can observe for 
example how in the second round of decentralisation reforms under the Raffarin prime 
ministership of the early 2000s, the regions were convenient agencies to take over roles in the 
management of ports and airports, as the departments were for managing non-motorway 
roads.  This was a sort of French style compromise, not privatising but certainly cutting down 
public steering power, given the lesser resources of regions and departments. 
Coherence is also a good watch word in the functioning of the national spatial imaginary (or 
imaginaries).  The recent pattern is of maintaining sectoral steering but within a looser 
implementation framework, given the more negotiated relationships between state and 
corporations, even when it in principle owns them.  This pattern still fits a wish to maintain 
some state control over the changing geography of the country.  This is in part for standard 
political and electoral reasons, given the sensitivity of the French polity to diagonal links 
between mayors, regional presidents, ministers and so on.  DATAR still exists, if in 
attenuated form, rather emphasising economic development and making localities fit to 
compete: it is thought worthwhile keeping, as an antenna of the central state in its 
geographical management role.  The Grenelle was, like the proposed national strategies of the 
1990s and the Schemas de Services Collectives of the Jospin government, an instrument to 
give coherence, this time for a France with a greener shape.  It is true that the Grenelle’s 
results have been variable, probably reflecting in part the ideological reluctance of a 
conservative government to indulge in state steering of a really ambitious kind (Boy et al 
2012).  However, this bundle of features reflects a country with still some sort of evolving 
spatial idea of what the country should be, even if this is a great deal more fuzzy and less 
explicitly debated and worked on than 30 or 40 years ago.  The urge in this imaginary is still 
for balance between different parts of the country, even if with possibly contradictory green 
and economic competition principles within this.  The view from Marseille or Bordeaux may 
still be different from that from Paris, but it is to be doubted if the divergence is as great as 
that from say Munich or Barcelona or Edinburgh with their capitals, to take other larger 
European cases.  The unitary French state still gives many opportunities to argue and 
negotiate out ideas of the country, within the much looser formulas of the half (or three 
quarters) neoliberalised country that France has become. 
4.2 Spain 
Spain has some similarities to France, inevitably so given the advance of neoliberalisation 
since Spain joined the EU and the post Franco decisive and continuing shift to a semi-federal 
state form.  But the differences are also marked.  As in the French case, it is important to see 
dimensions other than the predominantly political economic ones to which neoliberalising 
process theories mainly refer.  These are again above all the changing polity, but there are 
features of physical geography and history which are important, all of which are tied up with 
competing ideas of the country.  Since 2008 the economic crisis is placing many aspects of 
the state under extreme pressure.  Cutbacks in the infrastructure field accompany those of 
other kinds across the crisis hit state.  The discussion here largely avoids entering this boiling 
cauldron, which may, or may not, change everything. 
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4.2.1 Spanish neoliberalisation and state infrastructure policies 
Spain has taken a path similar to France in liberalising and privatising some of its 
infrastructure industries.  Public control remains significant, so alongside the largely private 
gas, oil and electricity corporations, which as in France and Germany have become major 
international players, there is an effectively public national grid company, a public rail 
company, and state managed hydrological agencies which oversee the investments of the 
range of companies, public and private, active in the water and waste water industries.  Ports 
and airports remain mainly public, although the ports have been largely handed over to 
regional governments, and the key airports of Madrid and Barcelona are due to be privatised, 
if satisfactory buyers can be found.  So there is a mixed political economy, as in France split 
now between the parts of the composite and pluralised state.  As everywhere, there is EU 
pressure to further liberalise, but it remains to be seen how this will impact on the current 
structure, most significantly in rail.  The layering effect of such a gradually changing mixed 
economy is very much present, with complexities introduced, as everywhere, by the real 
relations between different parts of the infrastructure industries and the rest of the economy – 
complex cross holdings are the norm, with the evolving economic crisis since 2008 seeing a 
shifting landscape of collapse, take over, bail outs and stress. 
The composite Spanish state has been on a continual knife edge of balancing and conflictual 
relations between central government and the seventeen regional governments.  Infrastructure 
decisions have long formed an important ingredient in this political process, with goods and 
bads and benefits and costs traded across the rather indeterminate constitutional landscape.  
In principle, infrastructure spanning more than one autonomous community (region) is the 
responsibility of the all-Spain government.  Plans are indeed made for gas and electricity 
links across Spain, to reasonably uncontroversial effect.   Rail and road plans have been made 
every few years as well by the Madrid government, based on the principle since the 1990s of 
“coffee for everyone” – every region and province to gain accessibility (Figure 3 shows the 
rail proposals in the 2005 road and rail plan, the PEIT).  Central government decides airport 
investment by the state agency AENA.  It also oversees port investment, though in reality that 
is mostly self financing and therefore rests more now with regional and private actors.   
Water investment is the terrain of the massively controversial national water planning 
process, ongoing since the 1980s, with conflict marking drafts, revisions and then sporadic 
investment, rather than the massive water transfers envisaged earlier.  Within-region water 
planning is now devolved to regions in most cases.  So in all these sectors there is a balance 
marked by still significant state central capabilities, but deeply affected by the power of 
regional governments and to some extent of private corporations.  Between them the 
neoliberalising political economy and the centrifugal force of the changing polity set the 
frame for all infrastructure planning and investing.  The EU has been a central feature of the 
political economic change over thirty years, with the pressure of liberalisation normally 
gratefully accepted by governments seeing this as the path of modernity (like being in the 
EU), and the very large EU funding of infrastructure also critical across all these sectors: the 
level of investment achieved would have been unimaginable without EU funding. 
Figure 3 here. 
4.2.2 Spatial imaginaries in Spain 
When we come to look at ideas of territory over this period, we see an enormously contested 
situation, much more so than elsewhere in western Europe, with conflict over the location and 
nature of territorial policy being at the heart of Spanish politics.  Over much of the period 
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there has still been some enduring idea of the peninsular’s geography and the different ways 
this may be shaped over long periods.  This has enabled the degree of sectoral planning 
mentioned above, but with clear stop signs when governments have tried to go beyond this.  
This was most evident in the national water plan fights, and in the period when the minister 
Borrell appeared to some to be trying to make an all-Spain national spatial strategy, the Plan 
Director de Infraestructures of 1993, something seen as inconsistent with a Spain 
constitutionally divided into government areas with wide competences.  And the all-Spain 
view has certainly had increasingly strong inflections, such that now the view from Barcelona 
(above all) is different from that from Madrid and other more central parts of the country.  
The all-Spain national imaginary is weaker, assailed by competing views from the “edges” of 
the peninsular.  
A Catalan academic, Germa Bel, has recently expressed this perspective, tracing the different 
viewpoints back to the formation of the Spanish state, and above all to the making of the 
centralised model under the Bourbon kings in the eighteenth century (Bel 2012).  The placing 
of Madrid as capital in the centre of the peninsular in 1561 generated a governing urge to 
connect the country by a radial pattern of roads and later railways.  This tendency has 
continued into recent history, he argues, with the radial geography being emphasised in the 
rounds of motorway construction and now high speed rail routes, as well as an 
overprioritising of Madrid as the single hub airport.  This analysis valuably connects the 
nature of a national imaginary with the deep history (Braudel’s longue duree) which gives it 
material and intellectual force – in this case going back several centuries.  We can see this 
clashing against the sensibilities, equally historically based, of the non-central Spanish 
regions and nations, who stress the importance of patterns which are not radial, but based on 
actual flows of traffic and people, which would suggest a more grid like transport system.  
Bel’s analysis is quite convincing.  It would hardly surprise French or British readers familiar 
with the radiality of their capital centred geographies.  At times he may overstress the 
rejection of non-radial investment elements.  Plans going back to Franco period times do all 
show the importance of the Mediterranean corridor and the Ebro corridor (neither radial), 
although Bel argues that in practice radial routes often trumped these when investment was 
decided, with the logic of connecting all important cities to the capital – rather than say 
Barcelona to Bilbao or Seville to Valencia.  At any rate, the book has generated argument 
within Spain and shows the strongly contrasting views of the country.  Such contrasts are less 
important in the field of energy, where national planning, much of it suggesting non-radial 
investments for gas and electricity transport, does not generate the same competing views.   
4.2.3 Spain – history, polity and infrastructure struggles 
Such a national picture is not easy to hold in the mind, for several reasons.  Many forces are 
acting at any one time, and with different layering effects.  The final effect of say completely 
privatising the rail system in Spain (to take a possible development, given the EU’s preferred 
models) would take many years to work out, and the impact would depend on the nature of 
policy on competing modes over that long period, the availability of fuels, the evolution of 
purchasing power in the key end points of rail journeys, the distribution of political power 
and tax power in the affected territories of Spain, and so on.   So a political economic change 
connects with evolving polity, inherited geographies of urbanisation and industrial activity 
(many early railways were primarily freight routes – very relevant given the EU TENs plans 
to be analysed below).  Equally, a particular set of balances and tensions has been seen to be 
present in the actual evolution of the last thirty years in Spain.  In this case it may be that the 
dominant forces have been political, above all the aspiration for “fair shares” for all parts of 
the country, and the chance that EU funding gave to deliver this investment in the transport 
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and water / waste water fields.  But this sat within a particular political economic balance, 
which allowed certain things to be delivered by the composite state in its various forms or by 
actors it could influence (such as gas and electricity corporations).  It is unlikely that, were 
one of these three elements (the territorial ethic, EU funds, and the political economic 
opportunity structure) not to have been present, the same infrastructure dynamic, seeing large 
amounts of new infrastructure construction, would have occurred.   
The period since 2008 may represent a new era, driven as much by the stresses created by the 
economic crisis as by the decaying of much of a shared all-Spain imaginary, with the 
apparent escalation of different ideas in different parts of the peninsular.  Neoliberalisation 
and state form changes may take different colours, sweeping infrastructure industries and 
macro-spatial planning approaches with them – most obviously if the Spanish state breaks up.  
Time alone will show if rupture or continuity win out. 
4.3 Netherlands 
The Netherlands is famous, at least amongst planners, for its commitment to comprehensive 
and long term planning of its territory.  This is an activity of national government, as well as 
of provincial and local levels.  National level spatial planning has endured in different forms 
for 70 years.  The National Spatial Strategy of 2005 was superceded in 2012 by the National 
Policy Strategy for Infrastructure and Spatial Planning (SVIR).  This is the first national 
strategy to be prepared by the Infrastructure and Environment ministry, the result of a merger 
in 2010 of the Transport and Water ministry (VenW), and large parts of the Housing, Spatial 
Planning and Environment (VROM) ministry.  These namings already indicate that the Dutch 
system gives importance now to infrastructure and has inserted this into its tradition of 
national physical planning – although the loss of the name Planning in the ministry title is 
indicative of a certain downgrading of planning’s status, which might mean infrastructure 
“consumes” planning, rather than vice versa.  We will see how the national planning tradition 
has been gradually shifting under the impacts of neoliberalisation and changes in the polity, 
although the latter have not been anything like as radical as in our other cases.  The shifts in 
the tradition carry with them and implicate changes in how infrastructure is managed 
nationally.  But, however extensive one judges the changes to have been, the reality remains 
of a uniquely coherent and considered approach to long term infrastructure thinking and 
strategising (Faludi and van der Valk 1994, Needham 2007). 
4.3.1 Dutch neoliberalisation and infrastructure planning 
The political economic changes have been gradual, moving to formally private forms in many 
infrastructure fields, including airports, rail, water, electricity and gas,  but with in most cases 
considerable or full public shares or influence over the resulting companies.  When genuine 
and full privatisation has occurred, as in the letting of Rotterdam’s waste incineration 
contracts to a multinational private equity firm, this has caused major concerns.  This was one 
motive behind the setting up of an inquiry in 2006-2008 by the national research agency into 
how public values were to be maintained in the face of such changes (Arts et al 2008, WRR 
2008).  This is a rare case of a country which has systematically considered the effects of 
liberalisation and privatisation on investment, and how this may or may not be consistent 
with maintaining the public service values held to be important.  It is true that the reports had 
apparently limited impact on the recent liberal and conservative led governments, but they 
may have helped to retain the cautious and hedged around approach to the privatisation of 
infrastructure industries which has marked the Dutch approach since the 1980s.  This is in 
spite of a generally strong commitment to principles of competition and a broadly liberal 
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approach to economic matters since the 1980s: this is however balanced by a view that other 
principles, of long term environmental and social sustainability, are also important. 
In the Dutch case, the link of neoliberalisation to debates on changes in the form of the state 
has been clearer.  The Netherlands is not a country with any basic worries about its status as a 
unitary state, but there have been ongoing discussions about the extent that national 
government should steer major sectors of public policy, as against the role of provincial and 
local governments, in existing or possibly in transformed metropolitan shapes.  The latest 
step in these arguments was the decentralising colour of the liberal-conservative government 
of 2010-2012, which sought to give more power to the traditional subnational governmental 
levels. The post-2012 government may make adjustments in this respect, but the coalition 
agreement does not point to a return to a strong national physical planning approach. 
This “local is beautiful” view fits a neoliberal approach to governing, alongside a 
commitment to private sector roles in many services, and so whilst the argument is not that 
changes to the polity are totally dependent in this case on the wider political economic 
ideological shifts, the link is much stronger than in France or Spain.   
This policy is enshrined in the latest national strategy (Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment 2011vii), in which thirteen issues are listed as the ones on which national 
government should concentrate: 
1. Outstanding business climate in urban regions. 
2. Energy network and transition. 
3. Pipeline network. 
4. Use of subsurface. 
5. Robust rail, road and waterway network. 
6. Better use of existing network capacity. 
7. Maintenance of existing transport networks. 
8. Improving environmental quality. 
9. Adaptation to climate change. 
10. Preservation of unique cultural heritage. 
11. Network for wildlife habitats. 
12. Military sites. 
13. Careful and transparent planning decisions. 
These encapsulate all major infrastructure issues, as well as those of security, including 
dealing with climate change. Now definitely excluded are the determination of settlement 
change, urbanisation and housing and economic development policies, which are set to be the 
prerogative of provincial or local levels.  In reality the Dutch government had been retreating 
from strong positions in these areas since the late 1990s, and so the latest strategy, if 
approved in its current form, will essentially codify this retreat.  Figure 4 is a map from the 
finally approved version of the national strategy, showing logistics links internationally, 
including TENs corridors and the main ports of Schiphol and Rotterdam. 
But the central role retained in infrastructure is clear enough.  The latest Planning Act (which 
came into force in 2008) changed the traditional way of dealing with these major issues.  
Since the 1960s there has been a system of National Key Planning Decisions, which has been 
used to plan for the future development of key sectors – transport, water, electricity 
transmission, pipelines, as well as individual major projects, such as those for Schiphol 
airport and Rotterdam port, and for the new rail lines for the high speed route and the freight 
Betuwe line.  These have been both sectoral planning and spatial planning exercises, in which 
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the planning ministry VROM was able to secure the coherence of such sectoral work with its 
overall spatial planning goals.  A system of collaborative working within government, up to 
the Cabinet level, ensured that this did in principle happen, although normal issues of 
ministerial power and government policy priorities naturally intervened.  Since 2008 the 
system is for a similar process of preparing structural visions.  With the merging of 
ministries, the planning role may be weaker, but clearly the possibilities of integrated 
approaches within one ministry are also considerable.  The Dutch system remains marked by 
a wish to integrate policy in these areas, and the presence of these high level institutional 
mechanisms continues to give a chance for this to happen.  The fact that considerable control 
remains in public or semi public hands in the main transport sectors (with for example public 
consortia controlling the companies running Rotterdam port and Schiphol airport) and in 
much of the water and energy systems, means that the levers are also there to turn long term 
policy directions into effect – although this evidently depends on financing and the political 
and ideological priorities of governments.   
Figure 4 about here. 
4.3.2 Dutch imaginaries and larger scale state spatial policy 
All this is tied up with the ideas of the country held by and debated within the Dutch public 
sphere.  The presence of the complex institutional machinery described above means that 
public discussion has been needed for many decades to decide on what territorial goals are 
paramount.  This is famously related to the position of the Netherlands as a territory needing 
continuous defence from the sea, and with an enormously complex balancing of water, land 
and air ecosystem processes. This has always pressed for a holistic and very consciously  
spatial approach to managing public affairs, with “the public” susceptible to a very broad 
conception.  This is generally seen as the basis of the national physical planning tradition, 
alongside the consensualised political system (Andeweg and Irwin 2005, Lijphart 1999).  
This means that there is a much more settled and “talked out” national spatial imaginary than 
in other countries, and this is both the basis for national spatial strategies, and the envelope 
within which these strategies can intersect with wider societal and ideological debates.  The 
longstanding discussions of spatial concepts like the Randstad and the Green Heart, or the 
invention of ideas like Mainports (Rotterdam and Schiphol – Netherlands as a transit 
country), all these are tributaries of a wish to pin down existing and potential future spatial 
realities.  One has only to compare the rather stuttering attempts to do the same thing across 
Europe to see the difference of a mature and evolving public sphere in the Netherlands: less 
successful examples might include the Growth Areas of the English Sustainable 
Communities Plan of 2003, the Grand Paris debates of the 2000s, the Flemish Diamond idea 
of the 1990s, the Madrid transport grid of the 1990s.  This imaging can happen at any level – 
Neuman (1996) discusses the metropolitan scale. But the national level spatial imaginary is 
surely one ingredient which would be essential for the effective thinking about long term 
infrastructure futures and their relation to other key elements of spatial change – urbanisation, 
the location of key economic activities, ecosystem functioning. 
This is not to say that the Dutch equipment of ideas and institutions has resulted in the 
coordination of planning and infrastructure development in a truly effective way.  Dutch 
commentators have been extremely critical of the functioning of their big spatial planning 
processes since the 1990s, seeing the planning of for example the new rail routes, especially 
the Betuwe line, as poor, and the stuttering and perhaps dishonest expanding of Schiphol as 
another case of how not to make good strategic decisions (Huijs 2011, Huijs and Annema 
2009, Priemus 2008, Priemus et al 2008, Zonnefeld 2005).  An outsider may take a less 
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critical view, on these and other cases.  It is clear that water or transport or energy planning, 
in varying degrees, is undertaken consciously in relation to wider spatial goals, and with 
some long term idea of the country in the minds of the strategisers and political deciders.  For 
the purposes of this paper, that is no small achievement, and so inevitably becomes some sort 
of benchmark against which other countries are judged.   
4.3.3 The Netherlands – neoliberalising away previous national spatial coherence? 
What then of the play of neoliberalising processes in the Netherlands?  Above all, this has 
been a primary factor in weakening comprehensive national spatial planning, as well as many 
of the levers on which that depended for its point – public funding of housing, a wider 
conception of the public interest, confidence in the implementation of major projects.  In 
relation to the last, the struggle to deal with the Betuwe freight line project may be seen as 
more about the tortuous modes chosen for implementation than basic planning questions, 
though those certainly existed.  These modes involved a complex set of public private 
parnership vehicles, combined with strong EU requirements due to the liberalisation of rail 
systems and therefore the need for common operational and safety standards (this being the 
first big project taking on this agenda).  When achieving a goal in an infrastructure project 
has to operate with hands tied behind the back of governing agencies in this way, it is not 
surprising that the whole governing enterprise can lose its orientation.  If the Dutch state were 
to try to resolve a really serious challenge now (as it did many times in the years since the 
1940s), it is not so clear that it could do so, for example achieving the goal of transition to a 
low carbon society. 
Against these effects, it is still the case that the neoliberalising processes have only gone so 
far, leaving some scope both to maintain planning competence, including at the national 
level, and to implement.  The fact that the Dutch national planning tradition has retained an 
important slot for infrastructure matters is a good example of how neoliberalisation often 
adapts and skews national peculiarities, rather than starting from some position more tightly 
linked to strong marketising ideology.  As it is, Dutch observers were not very happy with 
what they saw as the “infrastructural turn” in Dutch planning, whereby the weakening of 
more social interventions and the greater role of the economy ministries in planning, meant 
that infrastructure became perhaps the main concern of strategic planning by the turn of the 
century (WRR 1999).  But such a turn seems to be reinforced by developments since then, 
including the latest national strategy.  This may chime with the analysis of Brenner (2004), 
where he sees one key output of his “Rescaled Competition State Regime” as the promotion 
of “premium infrastructure” as a key instrument in local and regional competition strategies.  
In his work, this was largely focussed on the metropolitan level, but the point evidently 
applies nationally as well (or continentally, as the EU argues).   We will see how this also fits 
with ways of analysing approaches to infrastructure in our next case, the UK and its variants. 
4.4 The UK 
The UK is especially interesting, for several reasons.  It is the west European state that made 
neoliberalism into its key state project earliest and to the greatest effect.  This is especially so 
in infrastructure industries, whereby most of these were privatised by the mid 1990s – roads 
remain an exception, as in many otherwise determined marketising regimes.  There is 
therefore a longer history of operation under a private, but heavily publicly regulated, regime.  
Another feature is the effect this, and other factors, have had on planning.  Any chance that 
planning might take a strong nationally steered form disappeared after 1979, and although 
regional planning made a serious comeback between 1990 and 2010, this had only limited 
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strength for major infrastructure, given government resistance to any sort of national spatial 
framework.  Such resistance is surely in part due to the strength of neoliberalising ideology 
and practice over the last three decades.  A third interesting feature has been the divergence 
of practices in relation to infrastructure and planning between the four parts of the UK since 
2000.  This is examined below by looking at the regimes for England and Scotland.  The 
omission of Northern Ireland and Wales is not because their cases would not be of 
considerable interest.  Northern Ireland was quick to prepare a spatial strategy for the 
province, which is being reviewed (Department for Regional Development Northern Ireland 
2001, 2011).  The Welsh Assembly Government has been very active in preparing strategies, 
including the Wales Spatial Plan of 2004, also updated (Welsh Assembly Government 2008).  
However it has been decided to limit the main consideration to the case which has put most 
energy into national spatial planning, Scotland, alongside the UK government as a whole.  As 
before, first the political economic dynamic is briefly sketched in, before analysing the 
relation this has to national sectoral planning or ways of implicit planning, and to ideas of the 
countries that the UK, England and Scotland are becoming. 
 
4.4.1  UK neoliberalisation and infrastructure policies 
The dynamic of liberalisation and privatisation of infrastructure has been uneven and variable 
across time and sector, as well as across parts of the UK.  In Scotland water and waste water 
is still managed as a public sector operation, and in Wales the basic framework for the same 
industry is a non profit company.  Rail was fully privatised only in 1996, but the 
infrastructure came back into semi-public ownership in 2004, following the collapse of 
Railtrack.  Regulation has taken over various public interest roles across most industries 
(again roads being still an exception), and regulatory machinery therefore interacts in 
complex ways with the spatial planning system’s treatment of infrastructure.  For example, 
for a large water scheme, planning approval would be needed, under a new centralised system 
legislated for in 2008 and 2011, but more demanding would be for the relevant water 
company to satisfy the economic regulator OFWAT and the Environment Agency that a new 
reservoir was needed as part of the pricing and investment regime which those agencies 
oversee.  Another example is the airports regime, whereby for example the decisions on the 
expansion of London’s airports certainly come under the planning system, but the value of 
any investment to any airport operator is critically affected by the economic regulator, the 
Civil Aviation Authority, as well as by the decisions of the Competition Commission.  This 
last body intervened to dramatic effect after 2008, to force BAA to sell two of its three 
London airports. In the long run this will probably affect infrastructure decisions as much as 
or more than the policy and practice of economic or spatial regulation. 
 
In other ways UK infrastructure industries are different from those seen in other cases.  Most 
are now owned by non-British companies, and in some cases these are private equity 
companies with no general interest in the business concerned, but only on the extraction of 
financial gain, often in the relatively short term.  In energy and water sectors ownership by 
French, German or Spanish companies is almost the norm, whilst in transport the picture is 
more mixed, with UK companies also important in rail and bus.  The effects of such changes 
are not the main focus of interest here, but they may be expected to affect investment 
behaviour, one of the key concerns of countries now interested as much in long term security 
and responding to the low carbon agenda, as forcing down prices or generating operating 
efficiency.  This concern is quite evident in the National Infrastructure Plan approach, which 
has surfaced to be a main element of government policy in the last three years or so. 
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The National Infrastructure Plan (NIP) is not a plan in the normal urban planning sense of the 
word.  It is an approach to dealing with infrastructure policy which fits the UK model of 
private but regulated infrastructure industries.  It responds to the challenges of persuading 
infrastructure providers to invest in new or updated systems, in, as its authors see it, a 
radically open and competitive market for global finance.  It stems from a decision under the 
pre 2010 Labour government to set up Infrastructure UK, which would bring together 
previous bodies in the Treasury concerned with private finance initiatives, but link this to 
wider aspects of infrastructure policy.  As such, it was an imitation of similar bodies set up in 
Canada, Australia and Ireland since 2002, also in highly liberalised contexts where concern at 
falling investment since privatisations and the need for better government coordination were 
emerging as issues.  The idea of a National Infrastructure Plan was continued by the post 
2010 government, and the second and more developed version of the Plan was published in 
October 2011, with a progress report a year later (HM Treasury 2010, 2011, 2012).    
The Plan identifies a number of projects, mostly for road widening, which will benefit from 
government funding over the next few years.  These do not respond to any strategy, but 
simply assemble lists supplied by the four key infrastructure ministries (Transport, Energy, 
Environment and Business).  More significant are the parts of the Plan which discuss a range 
of initiatives to tackle regulatory regimes, including further efforts to ensure that projects are 
not delayed or rejected by the planning system.  The Plan is therefore an attempt to design a 
new policy approach, seeing infrastructure as both an element of the competitive equipment 
of a country and part of a bidding war for finance.  UK governments have been desperate for 
find funders for a new nuclear power programme (the dominant reason for the reformed 
planning consent regime under the Planning Act 2008) as well as for other important 
elements such as new roads, waste incineration or airports.  They consider that investors 
respond to a package of factors, including the ease of regulatory systems (including spatial 
planning), and the tax and subsidy systems (which can be designed to reduce the risk 
involved in large infrastructure schemes).   
4.4.2 Changes in state form and approaches to planning for infrastructure in the UK 
There are two important areas of change in the way the state has configured itself in the UK 
in the last 20 years or so, both of which impact on spatial policy and planning, in particular in 
relation to infrastructure.  Most evident has been the devolution settlement of 1998-1999, 
giving Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales various forms of self rule.  Brief treatment of 
the results in the area of macro planning and infrastructure is given here for Scotland.  
Second has been the variation in the treatment of England, in relation to national and sub-
national spatial policy.  The attempt to establish regional planning as a settled part of English 
governing was stopped in 2010, after twenty years of gradually advancing practice, 
essentially because of the difficulty in finding an accepted political settlement (Swain et al 
2012).  The regionalisation drive incorporated significant work on some aspects of major 
infrastructure, particularly for water supply issues, and in some regions in relation to 
renewable energy provision.  However most of the major transport and energy decisions 
remained within the hold of the UK government, as far as England was concerned, or in 
various shared forms, for the parts of the UK governed by devolved administrations after 
1999.  It is important to understand this divergence of paths since that date, and this explains 
the separate treatment given to Scotland here.  This is by no means equivalent to differences 
of treatment in countries like Spain or Germany which have systematic, constitutionally 
allocated powers to central and sub-central jurisdictions.  To understand the role of macro-
spatial planning in relation to infrastructure, there follows an examination of the overall UK 
approach, and a separate discussion of evolution of Scottish practice.  
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The normal UK government approach for many years has been to prepare sectoral strategies 
or plans for each sector (roads, rail, airports, energy, water and so on).  In the pre-
privatisation era, before the 1990s, these had strong steering and spatial components. Since 
then there have been complex arrangements to try to ensure coherence within each 
infrastructure sector, but these have normally been much less directive than in the continental 
European cases, except where effective state control has been maintained, as in road and rail 
infrastructures.  No attempt to summarise these sectoral steering processes is made here (see 
Marshall 2012 for more detail).  There were criticisms that the use of occasional White 
Papers did not give the clarity and certainty needed in a largely privatised system, and the 
sphere of major infrastructure planning was therefore hived off from the normal town and 
country planning system under the Planning Act 2008 (amended in 2011 and 2013, under a 
change of government). This new regime created a two step process for a nationally 
controlled system.  Firstly, departments draw up National Policy Statements (NPSs) for each 
sector (now mainly just for energy, and ports and national transport networks), which 
established the need to invest over coming years.  These are approved by Parliament.  
Planning consents are then given under a special speeded up procedure run by a National 
Infrastructure Directorate in the Planning Inspectorate, an agency of central government (for 
a short while an Infrastructure Planning Commission existed, with commissioners deciding 
independently of government ministers, but this was removed in 2011, and final decision 
powers returned to ministers).  After a public inquiry and decision process, which in its main 
examination stage should not take longer than six months, plus three months government 
consideration, the appropriate government minister can then issue most relevant consents in 
one package.   
Therefore, for the jurisdictions where this new regime applies (in England for all projects 
over certain threshold levels, in Wales in some sectors), this new approach represents a 
degree of change to the established pre-2008 approach.  However the NPSs are in the main 
not spatial documents (the exception being that for nuclear power, which designated all the 
eight sites where future power stations might be located).  The UK approach therefore 
continues to avoid any spatialised approach to the infrastructure field, except that which 
continues to go on within the relevant companies and bodies which plan for their own 
particular fields (examples are the grid transmission companies which work, with government 
input, in the Electricity Networks Strategy Group, as shown in publications in 2009 and 2012, 
or the water companies which prepare long term plans for investment, under the oversight of 
the Environment Agency). 
Both the elements described above, the reformed planning process and the NIP, surely 
represent responses to a relatively advanced stage of neoliberalising processes.  They reflect 
the urgency seen by both large corporations (now very influential actors in the UK polity) 
and governments, to remove the uncertainty and risk with which much infrastructure 
investment has been afflicted since the forming of the new private but regulated regimes.  It 
is interesting to contrast these with the reforms undertaken in Scotland during the same 
period.  As noted, privatisation is a little less complete there, but the same challenges may be 
seen to be present.  But the response of the Scottish government, given extensive but not 
complete powers on planning and infrastructure under the devolution settlement of 1999, was 
to create a National Planning Framework (NPF), first approved in 2004, and revised in 2009 
(Scottish Executive 2004, Scottish Government 2009).  NPF2 not only gave extensive, some 
might say exaggerated, attention to energy and transport issues, but also selected fourteen 
nationally designated projects which, after government approval, were held to be established 
as required in principle, subject to normal planning approval processes.  We see therefore a 
quite different response to the challenges of deciding key projects, much more similar to the 
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Dutch approach in some ways, although naturally lacking the years of experience and debate 
which Dutch national level planning can look back on.  Scotland has also produced 
Infrastructure Investment Plans, which summarise all capital investment by the Scottish 
government (Scottish Government 2008, 2011). These are less ambitious than the NIP, given 
that there is lesser control over regulatory and financial levers, compared with the UK 
government.  But they also point to a search for a more integrated public sector approach than 
is normal within the UK government. 
The key difference in Scotland from the UK government approach (which applies in fact only 
fully to England, partially in Wales) is the urge for a comprehensive spatial planning 
framework, not a series of sectoral schemes, whether in NPS or White Paper form.  Whether 
or not the fourteen key projects really flow that logically from the NPF, the attempt is there, 
as in the Netherlands, to see the future of the country in the round.  In the case of Scotland, 
this entails a fairly traditional approach, with the exception of the ambitious drive for basing a 
new economy partially on renewable energies (as well as continuing with old style gas and 
coal extraction). This has become a key part of the governing strategy of the Scottish 
Nationalist Party led governments since 2007, with energy and territory as core moblilising 
concepts in imagining independence for Scotland. 
4.4.3  Arguing for macro-spatial planning – explaining policy directions not taken 
There were in fact significant attempts to persuade the UK government that they should move 
to prepare comprehensive national spatial frameworks, whether for the UK as a whole, or just 
for England.  These attempts ran parallel to the regionalism era, and although both English 
regionalism and national framework approaches are now absent and perhaps unlikely to be 
promoted again in the near future, the arguments around national spatial frameworks provide 
an interesting contrast to the actual ways of managing this field as described above in the a-
spatial NIPs and NPSs.  A flavour of this “working against the grain” is given here, 
particularly some discussion of why the attempts have been, so far, completely unsuccessful. 
Pressure for some sort of spatial planning at national level built up from the early 1990s, and 
has been championed by professional and pressure groups, most consistently the Royal Town 
Planning Institute (RTPI) and Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA), since 1998 
(Alden 1999,  Ecotec and Faber Maunsell 2004, Heatherington 2006, National Planning 
Forum 2007, Shaw 1998, RTPI 2000, RTPI 2006, Wong et al 2000, Wong 2002, Wong et al 
2006).  Other efforts from the professional world included the persistent calls by the 
Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE) in its State of the Nation reports for a national spatial 
strategy or national infrastructure strategy (most recently, ICE 2012).  Government agencies 
also joined in such as the Council for Science and Technology, a prime ministerial advisory 
group (CST 2009), the Sustainable Development Commission (SDC 2011) and the 
Committee for Energy and Climate Change (2011). 
 
After 2010 the collapse of the regionalist project left a return to the national integrating 
approach the only way remaining for the enthusiasts of such bigger scale planning.  The 
TCPA published a transport oriented report (Heatherington and Hall 2010), and followed this 
by studies on England 2050? and The Lie of the Land! (TCPA 2011, 2012).  The RTPI for its 
part commissioned work on a Map for England from the same Manchester University 
academics involved in earlier exercises, with some results published in 2012 (Wong et al 
2012).  All of these began to advance more sophisticated ideas of UK and English geography, 
trying to open up the spatial imaginaries of planners and policy makers in a way that had not 
been attempted for many years.  Figures 5 and 6 show the business as usual (unwanted) 2050 
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scenario, and an idea of functional spatial clusters in a multi-speed England.   However, up to 
now the effort has not had any success. 
 
Figures 5 and 6 about here. 
 
Why was government resistant to any more integrated approach?  Why were the sectoral 
White Papers (for aviation, rail and energy as a whole) and (from 2008) National Policy 
Statements, the height of forward thinking government action at national level in the 
infrastructure sphere, and the Sustainable Communities Plan of 2003 the furthest reached on 
housing issues?  The resistance is deep seated, as only at the time of the 1965 National Plan 
did anything like an overview materialise from a UK government outside wartime, and that 
lacked spatial dimensions, to be brought out by regional planning machinery which duly 
produced strategies for much of the country up to the end of the 1970s.    Regional planning 
from 1990 to 2010 did clearly take an integrated approach to planning of the relevant regional 
territories and do much to subject some kinds of infrastructure to scrutiny within an overall 
spatial strategy, but this remained in most cases within a silo system of national government 
which delivered the key frameworks and funding decisions from above for each sector.   
There is a good case that the main reason for the resistance has been the path of 
neoliberalisation, within this most neoliberalised western European state.  The waning of 
support in the Netherlands from the late 1990s onwards is clearly consistent with this 
interpretation, as more and more liberalising and right wing coalitions weakened Dutch 
national spatial planning, with the most drastic attack coinciding with the most right wing of 
all, from 2010 to 2012.  The fact that more support was given to comprehensive strategising 
in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland from 2000 onwards does point to the specific 
determination of the UK centre in opposing such approaches for England, highlighting the 
force of market ideology within the core territory of the UK state.  The “outer” territories 
were able to imagine their future, at least in the Welsh and Scottish cases, helped by a sense 
of common culture, of nationalism, of perhaps a less fractured polity than the UK (in its 
governing England incarnation) had had for several decades, as well as, in the cases of Wales 
in Scotland, slightly more collectivist and interventionist political cultures as a whole.   
Neoliberalisation appears to have led to a situation where UK politicians were simply unable 
to think geographically about the area they were governing.  Is this in part because they 
thought this was simply wrong to do?  This would have been so for politicians completely 
wedded to the belief that the private sector must be left to decide on as many investments as 
possible, within the relevant regulatory regimes.  But many politicians were not so wedded – 
one has only to think of Conservatives like Michael Heseltine, or several ministers in the 
New Labour governments of 1997 to 2010, to realise that intervention was permissible to 
them.  For them, we need to consider the possible critical reasons for rejection.  These may 
include: 
• primarily ideological – ways of approaching issues were framed out so that a 
consistent study, analysis and prescription was unthinkable; this could include the 
removal of a manageable sense of the general or public interest, to which planning has 
always appealed at any level, and which is arguably a necessary prior condition to any 
spatial policy making; 
• primarily “political”, a fear of showing real priorities, annoying some part of the 
electorate or some part of the funding and power base of the parties;  
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• or mainly to do with the fragmented essence of the UK administration, only able to 
integrate on a few key issues, not issues seen as secondary such as this, where silo 
government rules.   
Each of the three may be given a more or less historical colouring, in that they can be seen as 
deeply rooted in state practices, with the balancing of spatial priorities long written into the 
repertoire of UK governments.  Such balancing can be argued to depend on being kept vague 
and if possible invisible, much of the time. Each of the above reasons no doubt contributed to 
the result, even if at any time one played the more powerful part.  However, it appears that 
ideology was critical to the choices made, given that the era when more explicit spatial 
policies were made was that ruled by one ideology (welfare state Keynesianism), whilst the 
current era must be described as far more liberalised.  The political and state administration 
factors must be seen as more embedded, running through both eras.  It has been clear that 
when definite ideological new paths have been taken, some of these political and 
administrative factors have been subject to change, when politicians have been sufficiently 
emboldened to press that change. 
The implications of that conclusion are clear enough – that an ideological shift is a necessary 
condition to move forwards on the policy issue discussed here, even though actors would 
have to be conscious of the need to operate on political and state administrative design 
elements at the same time. We return to this issue in the closing discussion in 6.0. 
4.4.4 Spatial imaginaries in the UK 
However, how should we balance the power of ideologies with the force of territorial ideas in 
the UK case?  Explicit strategies with spatial clarity for the UK or its parts have rarely been 
promoted.  A regional strategy existed from the 1940s to around 1980 to support the weaker 
economic areas, with assisted areas shown on a regularly revised map, including effectively 
much of the country outside southern England.  Since the 1980s this strategy has been less 
clear, rising and falling but without the strong commitment shown earlier, and often reduced 
to the areas shown as beneficiaries of EU regional aid.  Rather it has been argued, by 
geographers in particular, that the governments have in all cases leaned towards a “south 
first” policy in general policy and project support terms, thus reinforcing the dominance of 
southern England which stretches back for centuries through British history (Allen et al 1998, 
Amin et al 2003).   It is suggested that the idea of the UK is really an appendage of a Greater 
London / Greater South East, which contain and are symbolised by the monarchy, elite 
institutions, the capital city, the dominant financial industrial sector, and the core nodes of 
higher education, research and high technology dominance, as well now as nearness to 
European power centres.  This dominating national imaginary may, it is argued, be moderated 
at times, for example by the presence of Labour governments dependent on the votes of non-
Southern electorates, but is never really removed entirely.   
This broad picture of an idea of the UK as historically dominated by a London centred 
perspective makes much sense.  There have been both influential sub-national imaginaries 
centred on the North, on Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and on influential regional 
centres, and to some extent competing imaginaries emerging from these bases, but to a lesser 
extent than in the cases of France, Spain or Germany.  Devolution after 2000 began to change 
this pattern.  Previously any sectoral infrastructure strategy, for say airports or roads, tended 
“naturally” to have a focus on London and on its connections to the rest of the country, a 
tendency that had become stronger since the decline of the regional policy framework after 
1980.  The rise of to some degree competing power centres with different ideas of the future 
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after 2000 has partially destabilised this settled and dominant national imaginary.  But as 
shown above, UK governments have resisted recent calls to make national spatial 
frameworks, so big projects like the HS2 scheme for a high speed rail line linking London to 
the north (promoted by governments since 2008) are placed in a policy vacuum, clear of any 
spatialised and analytical discussion of gains and losses.  But the destabilised national 
imaginary and the absence of any general consensus make the implementation of such a 
scheme deeply problematic.  Legitimacy is founded normally on the basis of some sort of 
shared ideas, and in the case of large infrastructure projects, this has generally a large 
geographical component.  In the UK, a combination of the erosion of ideas of general interest 
by neoliberalising processes over several decades, and the gradual cracking of the polity, 
mean that thinking about big infrastructure futures is highly problematic, lacking both general 
and geographical coordinates.  Under these circumstances it remains to be seen whether the 
combined response of UK governments described above (reformed planning system, NIP) 
will be adequate for encouraging or securing much long term investment, whether for 
economic growth or low carbon goals. 
5.0 Discussion and conclusions from the case studies 
5.1 General conclusions 
Simply in relation to the three factors examined here, the country studies can be summarised 
as follows. Table 2 supports this. 
• France has had decreasing control through macro-spatial steering of major 
infrastructure, due to declining force in all three respects (neoliberalising, changes in 
state form, weaker spatial imaginaries).  But this decreasing control has been only to a 
modest extent, given that the decline on all three dimensions has only been partial. 
• Spain’s ability to steer major infrastructure has been reduced by strong impacts from 
the fragmenting state form, as well as the powerfully competing state imaginaries, 
but, like France, it has maintained some force in key infrastructure sectors, through 
continued central state control, despite neoliberalisation. 
• The Netherlands has maintained reasonable levels of steering capacity and some 
integrating capability between spatial planning and major infrastructure development, 
although this has been declining in the face of neoliberalisation forces.  The inherited 
force of continuing spatial imaginaries has served to reduce the impact that such 
neoliberalising would have had, in a similar way to the French situation, but with less 
impact from changes in state form. 
• The UK has experienced two somewhat divergent processes.  One has been the 
dynamic of divergent experience resulting from the devolution processes of the last 15 
years, meaning that the cases have to be examined separately for each of the four 
jurisdictions.  However the overall impact of neoliberalisation has affected to some 
degree the UK as a whole as well as each jurisdiction – but England to a much greater 
degree.  The absence of any historically integrated spatial imaginaries, beyond that of 
an implicit southern England centric model, has served to make this weakening of 
state steering of infrastructure development stronger in England, where it has not been 
countered by other post devolution political initiatives in spatial planning (as has been 
the case particularly in Scotland). 
It can be seen therefore that the force of neoliberalisation may in some cases be offset by 
continuing ideas of countries, facilitating attempts to steer infrastructure development 
coherently (Netherlands, France).  Equally changes in state form can reinforce the dynamics 
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coming from neoliberalisation in some cases (France and Spain), or push these forces in 
different shapes (the UK). 
Table 2 here. 
The broad conclusion from the case analyses is that the twin drivers of change in these 
European states are making the steering of infrastructure development harder.  Macro-spatial 
planning is only being used fitfully, with the exception of the Netherlands, and even there a 
more comprehensively integrated approach may be gradually falling away.  Coherent ideas of 
territories and possible futures have been weaker than in the past, and in several cases more 
and more contested.  This weakness and contestation is equally driven by the same two forces 
of neoliberalisation and changes in state forms. 
The responses to these developments have been various, matching the strong variety of each 
state trajectory.  One emerging approach has been the one characterised by the UK National 
Infrastructure Plan, trying to make the management of “UK PLC” fit for the world market, by 
adjusting spatial planning (in the 2008 Planning Act), financial incentives and regulation, 
aspiring to a new “integral steering” model.  A second approach is to adapt spatial or sectoral 
planning approaches, as in the new Dutch national spatial frameworks, the frameworks in 
Scotland and Wales, and the more sectoralised steering in France (SNIT, Grenelle) or in 
different vein, in Spain (for rail and road, and energy networks).   A third strand is emerging, 
as the EU tries to reform its TENs processes, so aiming to overcome the confusions and 
difficulties generated by the liberalisation of energy and transport systems and the parallel 
weakening of national state capacities. 
These responses are by no means negligible in their varied attempts to meet the challenges 
caused by the difficulties being encountered in infrastructure development. However they 
have, at least so far, significant weaknesses, with none looking very likely to “fill the gap” 
left by the falling away of state steering capacities, whether these were strongly or weakly 
spatialised, strongly or weakly comprehensive or sectoralised.   Following the analysis above, 
this is because they are unable to address the root cause of the problems, generated by 
powerful neoliberalisation and state form drives.  It may be logical to assume that only 
changes which altered these drives, particularly that of neoliberalisation, would have a chance 
to impact effectively, especially if the aim is to make trend breaks, transitions to forms of 
living (low carbon in particular) which are unlikely to be selected for in neoliberal regimes.  
Such turning back of neoliberalisation is likely to take different forms in each national 
context – although recent critical work on the deepening crisis in Europe and the EU has 
suggested the need for the EU to press some common policies (EuroMemorandum 2013).   A 
reversal of the changes in state forms seems less likely, and, from the perspective taken here, 
less desirable.  It is perfectly possible for well articulated infrastructure and macro-spatial 
planning approaches to function within the more devolved and multi-level systems common 
now in most European states. 
Such a change of course would at least make available the option of the (re)construction of 
macro-spatial planning in the service of major infrastructure development, above all in 
energy and transport fields, developed through democratic forms.  French and Dutch 
experiences still provide some guidelines and inspiration for such reconstruction, with the 
French CNDP (public debates) system being one developing model (Fourniau 2007, Revel et 
al 2007).  Another key ingredient, visible in all the continental European cases, is an effective 
conjugation of democratically elected levels of government to work out desirable pathways to 
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new models of infrastructure systems.  A combination of work between all spatial levels is 
needed to make democratic sense of infrastructure futures. 
5.2 Further threads from the case analyses 
Three supplementary threads can be drawn out of the analysis.   The first is that it is essential 
to focus on the specifics of each state, as well as the variegating processes coming “from 
outside”.  In one sense the polity is one, the EU plus all its members, but in another sense 
each national polity is radically on its own.  The same applies to the political economic 
regimes.  Infrastructure regimes remain obstinately national in some respects, but have to be 
understood within the internationalised industry landscape, where Asian corporations may fill 
the funding gap for UK nuclear power stations, and where Rotterdam port competes with 
Hamburg port, both in public ownership but under equal international pressure (their leaders 
would argue).   Infrastructure planning regimes are now being pressed by the EU towards the 
best practice identified as the UK planning reforms of 2008-2011, a sort of convergence that 
has by and large not emerged in the normal planning systems, but which is clearly seen as 
critical at the major project level by some interests.   So the field of infrastructure gives a live 
picture of the processes of regulatory differentiation underway through neoliberalization, as 
conceptualised by Brenner et al (Section 2.1).  There is some indication too that there are 
tendencies in Europe (through the EU and the large utility corporations) and globally 
(through policy copying of the Infrastructure Canada/Australia/etc type) towards some 
common approaches, to play against the national distinctiveness brought out here.  If 
neoliberalisation is not turned back, it is likely that such responses will gather force, imposing 
financialised and economy dominated approaches to infrastructure development over more 
socially or environmentally led policy directions. 
The second thread takes the above general conclusions further.  The analysis reveals that 
there is considerable scope for improving the relationship between wider thinking on 
infrastructure futures and spatial planning practices.  The Dutch model here was presented as 
having many strengths, without intending to idealise it.  The need to think about 
infrastructure change geographically and in some more effective democratic ways suggests 
the need for elected governments to take more responsible and considered approaches to 
spatial issues, as against concentrating only on market driven mechanisms related to 
financing and regulation, important though these clearly are.  Sectoral planning processes, 
like the National Policy Statements in the UK, are too weak, as they systematically hide 
important connections, making policy for low carbon futures, for example, much harder to 
move towards.  This should bring big spatial planning back onto national political agendas, if 
not at national level, then at federal state or region level as may be appropriate in some 
sectors and cases.  Work by non-governmental groups like the England 2050 and Lie of the 
Land projects (TCPA 2011, 2012) shows that something can be done, even with few 
resources: government backed efforts could do far more.  At the same time though it must be 
realised that large parts of key spatial planning policies will continue to be made “behind the 
backs” of any open planning activity, by the way zones of change have been “framed out” of 
planning, by sectors becoming marketised, or by scale changes such as “localism” which 
removes the scope for public consideration of big choices.  Academic analysis could 
contribute to bringing out such “invisibilised planning” by states, and making it visible to 
publics. 
The third thread is more reflective, on the implications for developing thinking about spatial 
imagining.  This is more in the form of questions than conclusions.  How might the implicit 
models that are clearly present in countries be brought out into the political daylight – or is 
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this always going to be too much against the grain of politics, at least in normal times?  What 
are the implications of developing divergences between spatial imaginaries, within states, for 
example in Spain or the UK?  Are there ways that this could be brought out also into the 
open, to generate more productive politics and policy making?  Could academic work  
contribute to these research and public sphere processes?  How far could better understanding 
of long historical processes, with the type of analysis done by Bel on Spain, help to make 
manifest the deepness of the challenges of shifting some geographical dynamics?  There is 
plenty of experience in running federal systems, which have invented kinds of answers to 
many of these questions, but as ever, answers will be uniquely tailored, as so federal 
“lessons” will only take us so far.  Other answers may well be found in fresh dimensions of 
democratic systems, which remain still to be exploited much more fully, beyond any simple 
representative and deliberative splits (see for example Saward 2010). 
6.0  Implications for the creation of national spatial steering mechanisms 
What are the implications of these considerations for any conceivable spatial strategising at 
national level?  Do they make such strategising so unlikely as to be not worth pursuing?  
What steps might be valuable in promoting a turn to more integrated and intelligent long term 
strategising, necessarily including major infrastructure directions.  A particular issue is what 
might fertilise the development of lively and effective spatial imaginaries, drawing on the 
considerations in section 3.2.   Are there first steps that can be taken which might open up a 
more creative and dynamic imaginary?  
The analysis works by taking the UK as a case study, concentrating on what might be done 
particularly in England.  The UK is in itself an interesting case, and it is to be hoped that 
some of the lines of thinking may have relevance in other European state cases, although 
clearly the distinctiveness of each case makes such cross-context working something that has 
to be approached with great care.  A preliminary condition for progress on most of the ideas 
below would be major shifts in the trajectories of liberalisation, which has been seen as the 
main force affecting approaches to infrastructure and macro-spatial planning. 
6.1 Proposals 
6.1.1 Process aspects 
How might a more strategically coherent approach to state and public policy steering be 
worked towards?  In principle, if some political interest could be found for such a project, 
there might be three dimensions which, especially if combined, might have an effect.  The 
broad lines are in the words data, democracy, deliberation and dissent.  Those in other EU 
states may be able to analyse their situations and the scope for reforms in somewhat parallel 
manners; but it is not appropriate here to try to recommend reform paths from an outsider 
perspective. 
One would be the approach perhaps best epitomised by German practice, which emphasises 
sharing of best practice across all planning levels, in the ARL (Akademie fur Raum- und 
Landesplanung), and the collection of data and high grade analysis, in the BBSR, the research 
institute managed by the federal government.  Academics in Britain have at times pushed in 
this direction, as discussed in section 4.4.3 on a Map for England, where the impacts of 
national policy were mapped onto the territory of England, to simply trace incoherences or 
potential opportunities.  The German four yearly spatial planning report to the Bundestag is a 
far more substantial affair, with consistent research backing and data series.  A government 
push along these lines, though not easy to justify in the absence of wider support for steering 
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programmes, might be able to turn the climate of opinion, by showing the realities of long 
term change and the effects of government policies.  The call for a “Companion Guide” to sit 
alongside the NPPF, including arrangements for monitoring, has some of the same data 
oriented approach (Swain 2011). 
A second approach would be to work from recent policy drives precisely in the area of 
infrastructure, including the National Policy Statements and the National Infrastructure Plan 
of the Treasury, with a cross cutting unit having a spatial-environmental brief to promote 
consistency in these policy instruments.  An important element of this would be to expose 
this process of continuous monitoring, discussion and adjustment to public view, with regular 
“examinations in public” of issues, using television and all relevant media.  Equally 
important would be to link this process to government backed research in universities, so that 
arguments could be directly plugged into research work, in turn exposed to public debate.  
This would therefore expand the field opened up by the policy initiatives of 2007-2011, but 
within a frame which took seriously the need to build an open area of public discourse, 
relating to party and pressure group politics, not pretending to be in some autonomous and 
expert zone of governance. 
A third approach would take its lead from the French initiative of 2007-2012, the Grenelle, 
accepting that the area of spatial planning is too tied into most other areas of political 
controversy and that what is needed is an opportunity, probably at regular intervals (perhaps 
once a decade, shortly after each census) to arrange a national deliberative democratic 
process to obtain a broad consensus about the needs for national construction or 
reconstruction.  The Grenelle was structured round a highly Green agenda, and that gave it 
coherence and a strong linking to all major infrastructure issues, and to some extent to other 
macro spatial planning questions.   In the UK/England, it may be much harder to imagine a 
successfully built coherence in this way, but surely some governments could gain from such 
an open attempt, which would expose public policy making to full view, and possibly build 
wider public understanding of issues and trade offs facing governments.  At least conflict and 
dissent would be exposed to debate, and perhaps areas of agreement identified.  The England 
2050 report made the same sort of proposal, suggesting a Royal Commission made up of non 
party, independent members – a rather less politicised approach, perhaps with parts of the 
first approach mentioned above. 
How would these three approaches work together?  They could be tried independently, and 
each would have some value that way, and might lead on to steps on the other paths.  All 
would serve to widen the public conversation on options, data and imagining futures, if 
conducted in the ways suggested above.  A new expertise would be created (such expertise is 
quite evident to any outside observer in the Netherlands, France and Germany, even in the 
present era of large scale government cutbacks), alongside a more informed public.  If the 
third were attempted this might lead on to initiatives in the first and the second forms, simply 
because the current research and data weakness of UK government, and the incoherence of 
major infrastructure policy making, would doubtless be rapidly visible.  A combination of all 
three would be most effective, placing the (occasional) national debate alongside the 
continuous process of adjusting infrastructure and sectoral policy making, all placed on a 
firmly data rich and researched foundation.  Clearly this is a long way from the understanding 
of the tasks of government which is the norm in the neoliberalising variant which is the UK.  
But the traditional arguments of efficiency gains would certainly be appropriate in this case.  
Getting geography wrong, misinvesting in infrastructure, being unable to deal with 
widespread social conflict about the future, all pose massive burdens on state budgets.  The 
sorts of initiatives described above would cost a fraction of any such burdens, however 
35 
 
ideologically threatening they would appear to the neoliberalising mindset.  In fact the cost of 
all three together must be infinitesimal when set against most large infrastructure projects. 
Are there other more creative ways to whet the appetite for building future oriented spatial 
imaginaries?  Almost certainly yes.  If the joint forces of the creative industries and the 
scientific/cartographic/geographical academic milieux could be combined, it seems almost 
certain that new thinking could emerge to build new spatial images and imperatives.  The 
work of geographers like Danny Dorling has pointed to the scope for imaginative liberation 
in this sense in recent years (Dorling and Thomas 2004, 2011).  But these tracks would need 
to emerge from some collective working together, which might be spurred from one or more 
of the above initiatives.  The fights now endemic in England over new infrastructure and new 
urbanisation may be making clear the advantages of developing new ways of thinking about 
social-economic-geographical futures. There is real “governance pain” caused by having no 
conceptualised and visualised ideas of future geographical pathways. 
Substantive aspects 
In substantive terms, what might a renewing spatial imaginary for England and perhaps the 
UK gets its teeth into?   The above more process oriented proposals point towards some of 
the key elements needed.  A long term and ideologically clear framing would be needed, in 
order to give a sufficiently integrating and connecting force to any government or societal 
project.  This must then lead to the invention of effective storylines, narratives, images (Hajer 
1995, Neuman 1996).  Ideas on geographical transitions or transformations would need to 
advance with such simplifying mental constructs and techniques in mind.  Some handles have 
been given by metaphors or terms generated in recent years, including polycentricity and 
national rebalancing.  Both of these point to a more even distribution of economic success 
over England / the UK, which would in turn lay a basis for more even distribution of 
demographic pressures, generating in turn more evenly spread development pressures.  These 
were precisely the basis of the classic French drive to promote cities and regions far from 
Paris, as well as the balancing efforts in regional policies in many states, including the UK.  
However no such formulas have been promoted in the UK, at least in explicit forms, since the 
1980s.  More dominant have been the arguments that agglomeration is essential for economic 
success on the global stage, and that in the UK case this involves unconditional support for 
the Greater South East, as the “golden goose” which lays the eggs of economic growth 
(Leunig and Swaffield 2007, Martin 2008, Massey 2007).  If that were the path to be taken, 
then the market’s imaginary hardly needs to pin down the state role explicitly, being content 
with occasional interventions when politically or economically vital (to overcome critical 
economic crises, or to maintain public order).   
In practical spatial planning terms, the steps could be as follows. 
First, a simple mapping and analysis exercise, starting from the sorts of multiple overlay 
work hinted at in A Map for England.  This could valuably learn directly from Dutch national 
planning traditions, with its several layers approach.  These have provided a first layer of 
physical forms, green and blue, with over that the major long term hard-to-change elements 
such as big infrastructure and fundamental settlement forms, followed by the faster changing 
rhythms of behaviours, small physical alteration, management shifts – crossing into spatial 
management not major physical change. 
Secondly, there could be a “relational sensitisation” stage, as referred to above, which would 
above all work at several scales simultaneously, moving diagonally and jumping scales, to 
seek to work through what changes if other paths are taken in different modes and registers.  
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This could only emerge politically and openly, in a networked planning process which cut 
back and forth from localities to sub-regions up to central levels and where appropriate, to 
continental issues – just as Dutch national steered planning was accustomed to do during its 
heyday from the 1960s to around 2000, in case this sounds impossibly tortuous. 
The substance could be valuably informed by historical understandings.  In the same way as 
public debate in Spain is informed by discussions such as that of Bel on four centuries of 
state policy, and Raymond Williams (1965) spoke of the Long Revolution when discussing 
societal change, going back a similar time period, any full discussion of transitions, whether 
ecological, economic or social, may need to think about very long term “power geometries”.  
In some respects it is fortunate that the possible break up of the United Kingdom (in the 
shape of the independence of Scotland) places such long term thinking on the intellectual 
agenda.  However the risks that the confusing and entangling effects of nationalism will 
overcome their clarifying and stimulating side are real, and it will require a conscious effort 
by planning thinkers to try to argue through possibilities, alongside bigger public discussions.  
Projects of deep controversy such as those for transport or energy infrastructure (the TGV 
Mediterranean in France in the early 1990s, Stuttgart 21 in Germany recently, HS2 and 
windfarms in England now) can equally be the spur to thought and innovative response, if 
approached in the right way.   
Finally, the continental dimensions need to be addressed, in all the fields where they are now 
of pressing relevance – energy supply, freight transport systems, air travel, shipping and the 
management of the European seas.  The commentary on the TENs reforms in section 3.3  
pointed to the current policy directions of the present EU regime.  These may be seen as 
having serious weaknesses, especially their sectoral character, backed by the low legitimacy 
of the EU polity.  However some ways to approach these supra-national issues will be 
needed, and this applies as much to the UK as it does to all other European states.   What has 
been suggested above has abstracted from the continental dimension, but this is not possible 
in reality.  All discussions of port or airport or freight line expansions (or contractions), or of 
energy policy options, need to be framed by advances in this wider policy area. 
7.0  Final overview 
Any overview of the current range of policy making for major infrastructure in developed 
countries takes us a long way from the sorts of potential directions discussed for the English 
case above.  The authoritative and official storylines are generally quite different from those.   
The dominant one, promoted equally by international organisations and national 
governments, is that the market must be the mechanism for curing infrastructure deficits.  The 
UK National Infrastructure Plan has a similar character to those for Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand in that sense, even if the balance of goals, especially in relation to low carbon 
trajectories, appears to differ significantly.   A secondary narrative, particularly since 2008, is 
that states do in fact have an important role, in classic Keynesian terms, to get the economy 
going again, which can be most straightforwardly done by state spending on “shovel ready” 
projects in infrastructure fields (OECD 2009).  But this is rarely painted as something 
desirable in itself, but a temporary measure to get the economies back on the right 
neoliberalising path.  Observation of such programmes shows generally that high carbon 
directions remain the norm.  The EU policy directions since 2008 are distinctive in, on the 
face of it, pressing low carbon directions as core elements of strategy.  However, given the 
nature of the EU, very largely dependent on the actions of member states and large 
corporations, this narrative may remain unimplemented.   
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Such an overview should act as a reminder of the real nature of “actually existing” stances on 
major infrastructure and so give a clear message that the sort of more publicly directed spatial 
steering advocated above is remote from current realities.  Some sort of major jolting, by 
power shifts of some kind and by real world economic challenges, would be a precondition 
for transformation in these profoundly ideologically formed landscapes of state positioning.  
In the terms of Brenner’s 2004 book, the state strategies as much as the state spatial strategies 
would need massive transformation in all the countries surveyed here, with the partial 
exceptions of the Netherlands and Scotland.  Such change could only realistically come from 
the supercession of the varieties of capitalism dominant in recent decades.  A thorough 
rebuilding would be needed of the thinking about the way that the futures of societies are 
reconstructed within their territories.  Green thinking has tried to move in this direction in 
recent years, in the formulation of “transition stategies” - as in Transition Towns, for 
example, in a localist form (Hopkins 2008).    But this type of imagining of futures has never 
effectively bridged across to the dynamics that wider social and economic transformation 
would involve.  Recent discussion of “degrowth” may move in this direction (Aries 2011, 
Xue 2012), rooted as it normally is in anti-capitalist understandings.  All this may appear to 
take us a long way from the everyday world of roads and airports or national planning 
frameworks.  But it can be argued that a field such as major infrastructure, given its very 
evident systemic insertion in global supply chains and other such basic economic-ecological 
features, cannot help bringing us back to such considerations.   One message from that is that 
academics and professionals interested in such areas need to ask very basic questions, start 
from first principles, if they are to make a useful contribution in future, rather than tread 
carefully along the middle of the intellectual and political roads.   Such instruments as the UK 
National Infrastructure Plan can give first handholds or initial hints about where state policy 
making might go, but pure incrementalist policy thinking in that way is unlikely to take 
spatial planners far in any directions which might in due course generate some democratic 
legitimacy and conviction.  
Two final suggestions are given in relation to further work.  A productive lens for further 
work will surely be to take infrastructure policy as a defined field in its own right, which can 
then identify “national infrastructure approaches”, examined across several normally 
separated state roles (financing, regulating, spatial planning).   This could help to produce a 
far more satisfying idea of what a “National Infrastructure Plan” could be, than the one 
produced in the UK in 2011, interesting though this pioneering effort is in many ways.  
Somehow, the ingredients of state action, private and financial power and long term ideas and 
aspirations need to be combined in a more effective way. 
Secondly one other perspective has hardly been explored here, but must be critical for taking 
these issues forward.  This much wider lens would consider the relation of the changes 
discussed here to democracy.  The attempts to “depoliticise” decisions in policy fields such as 
these has been related to tendencies to “de-democratisation” (Flinders 2012, Hay 2007).   The 
EU is widely seen as a political phenomenon with weak democratic legitimacy, raising issues 
about situating decision processes at that level.   Discussion of democracy also needs to take 
note of the mutations ongoing in nationalism in all the cases studied.  Infrastructure questions 
are in part nations questions, and understanding this may help to develop non-technocratic 
ideas of future forms, appreciating that passionate commitments have great force in this 
policy zone, and that these need to be talked through.  This perspective would also deal with 
the implications of current political economic trajectories and the evolving national spatial 
imaginaries (both analysed here), but with the greater focus on the normative and institutional 
design issues present in any discussion of democracy (Stoker 2010). 
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Figure 1 
Trans-European Transport Network:  Proposed core network, for railways (freight), ports, 
rail-road terminals (RRT),  
Source: CEC (2011) Annex to proposal for a Regulation on Union guidelines for the 
development of the trans-European transport network, COM(2011) 650 final/2, Brussels: 
European Commission. 
Figure 2 
Schema National des Infrastructures de Transport, rail freight proposals 
Source: Ministere de L’Ecologie, du Developpment Durable, des Tranports et du Logement  
(2011) Schema National des Infrastructures de Transport (draft October 2011), Paris: 
Ministere de L’Ecologie, du Developpment Durable, des Tranports et du Logement 
Figure 3 
Railway network actions proposed under the PEIT to 2020  
 
Source: Ministerio de Fomento (2005) Plan Estrategico de Infraestucturas de Transportes, 
Madrid: Ministerio de Fomento.  
 
Figure 4 
Map showing (inter)national accessibility of urban regions with leading economic sectors 
Source: Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment (2012) Structuurvisie Infrastructuur en 
Ruimte, The Hague: Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment. 
Figure 5 
England in 2050. Business as usual scenario 
Source: TCPA (2011) England 2050, London: TCPA. 
Figure 6 
Functional spatial clusters in multi-speed England 
Source: Wong, C. et al (2012) A Map for England.  
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i See Marshall, T. (2012) Planning Major Infrastructure, Abingdon: Routledge, Marshall (2011a, 2011b), and 
working papers to be found on each national case study at the project web address. 
http://planning.brookes.ac.uk/research/spg/projects/infrastructure/index.htm 
ii Again, much more analysis can be found in Marshall (2012). 
iii Recent work in discussing alternative planning cultures, in the search for an explanatory model for the 
evolution of change in spatial planning across Europe, has both drawn on cultural approaches (Knieling and 
Othengrafen 2009), and on parallel discussions on social welfare systems (Nadin and Stead 2008). 
iv The Australian bank Macquarie developed a global approach to private equity investment with special 
emphasis on infrastructure funds, thus becoming by 2008 a major holder of assets such as toll roads and airports.  
O’Neill (2010) gives one account of the phenomenon.  
v This is the body set up in the 1960s to oversee territorial dimensions of French state policy.  It still exists 
though with a reduced role. 
vi The hexagon is the term used conventionally in France to describe mainland France, derived from the shape 
that this can be seen as having, in very broad terms.  No doubt few countries imagine themselves as a shape 
(geometric or otherwise), perhaps indicating an explicit French consciousness in thinking about themselves 
territorially. 
vii This list is taken from the draft strategy, which is to be found with an English summary, but the difference 
from the final strategy is not I think great.  The final strategy of March 2012 was not yet translated to English at 
the time of writing. 
